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International Legal Scholarship Under Challenge 
ANNE PETERS* 
5.1 Introduction 
International law is in crisis. This is nothing really new - we have faced 
crises after 9/11/2001 and the 'war on terror' (with its serious and ongoing 
erosions of human rights law), after the unlawful Iraq war of 2003 which 
was a serious violation of the prohibition on the use of force, since the 
2008 breakdown of the WTO Do ha negotiation round, and so on. Still, the 
crisis in Crimea may constitute a turning point in the development of 
international relations in Europe. Russia in 2014 incorporated parts of the 
territory of another sovereign state and thereby resorted to a political 
strategy that was common in the 19th century, but surely was considered 
passe in Europe at the beginning of the 21st century. We seem to witness 
the opening of a new (or old) ideological fissure of Europe which also 
seems to affect scholarship: academic assessment of the Crimea crisis 
mirrors the geopolitical camps. Hardly any 'Western' scholar deems 
Russia's political course justifiable and justified under the precepts of 
international law. Inversely, Russian scholars happily justify the annexa-
tion of Crimea within the framework of the existing international legal 
order, notably by pointing to the right of self-determination.1 
That cleavage thrusts into the limelight the problem of epistemic 
nationalism (charge no. I). The critique is that much or all international 
legal scholarship is (maybe inevitably) determined by the national 
background of the researcher and therefore suffers from unconscious 
national bias (or is even openly guided by national interest). And as the 
most influential scholars are 'Westerners', the result seems to be that not 
* This chapter uses elements of my article 'Realizing Utopia as a Scholarly Endeavour' 
(2013) 24 EJIL 533-52. I thank the participants of the Max Planck research seminar and 
1 
the editors of this volume for valuable critique on a previous version of this chapter. 
C. Marxsen, A. Peters and M. Hartwig (eds.), 'Symposium: "The Incorporation of Crimea 
by the Russian Federation in the Light of International Law'" (20 15) 75 ZaoRV 1. 
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only international law as an object of study but also international legal 
scholarship as a whole tends to be Western-centric. 
Besides or instead of nationalism, other '-isms' may impact on i~ter­
nationallegal scholarship: idealism, universalism, humanism, liberahsJ11, 
capitalism, empiricism and so on. While these sets of ideas may have 
different substance and occur on different levels of abstraction, the 
perceived overarching problem here is that the work done by intern~­
tionallegal scholars is (inevitably) value-loaded and even ideological tn 
the negative sense of being tied to a range of manipulative belief systems 
(the charge of ideology, charge no. 2). . d 
Besides these two related charges, further important concerns are vo~ce 
in the current debate on international legal scholarship as a professton. 
These concerns are directed against different types of scholarship, and are 
not necessarily mutually reconcilable: some charges overlap, while so!l1~ 
contradict each other. Notably the links between international ~~~ 
scholarship and practice are often considered problematic. Some thl 1 
that much scholarship is too close and too much influenced by Iega 
practice, while others think that much of the research activities are to~ 
detached from practice. The observation here is that acade~ics fi: t 
themselves in a catch-22: if their activity blurs with legal practice, w a 
they do is at best some kind of handcraft or technique. If however the~ 
steer far from practice, their writings will not have any impact on the ~at 
world of international law as applied. The result would be that w ~ 
academics in the field of international law do is basically meaningles~ ill 
intellectual, social and political terms. I call these the charges of unscho ar-
liness (charge no. 3), and the charge of irrelevance (charge no. 4). . h t 
The fifth concern, probably most popular in the United States, iS t a 
. · too 
much of (notably European) international legal scholarship iS _ 
doctrinal, limiting itself to purely internal arguments about legal c~n 
structs, interpretation according to the traditional canons, concentratlllg 
on legal terms, seeking to systematise and harmonise legal provisions~ 
and commenting on judicial decisions (the charge of doctrinalism, charg 
no. 5). This chapter addresses the five charges one by one. 
5.2 Charge No. 1 
5.2.1 The Perils of Epistemic Nationalism 
'Epistemic nationalism' is the twofold phenomenon that internatio~a; 
legal scholars often espouse positions which can be linked to their pr!O 
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education in th . d 
interest.2 Th eJr ot~estic legal system
 and/or which serve the natio
nal 
often 0 e fi
rst vanant, thinking along o
ne's familiar legal tradition, 
ho111e c ccurs uncon
sciously, while the second v
ariant, supporting one's 
the Per 
0
.untry, may happen deliberate
ly or unwittingly. A parallel is
sue is 
It is fo;Is~nt segregation of research institutions
 along national lines. 
college ; . at reas~n, too, that we nowadays doubt 
that the 'invisible 
l970s3 .
0 
mternatwnallawyers' as inv
oked by Oscar Schachter in 
the 
scholar Is ~eally a global college. It rather seems to
 be an elite college of 
so-calle~ 0G the developed world, a college in which a
cademics from the 
Wh .1 lobal
 South are relegated to the ro
le of the eternal students. 
1 
e conscious o · 
· 
· 
· 1' · d 
usually . r uncon
sciOus ep1stem1c natwna 1sm
 ts nowa ays 
Proper .considered problemat
ic; it has on the contrary been
 heralded as 
exact 8 ~n the past. The idea that scien
tific and scholarly activity (in the 
the nat~~~nc~s as in the humanities and social science
s) is contingent on 
took hold ~llty of,the researchers. and should properl.y b
e thus contingent 
becal1le I~ the War of the Mmds'
4 during the First World War 
and 
explicit dma~nstream during National Socialis
m. The most prominent 
so-called ;mal of the universa
lity of science was the procla
mation of the 
Johan German Physics' w
hich was promoted by Nobel 
Prize winners 
nes Stark und Philipp Lenard
.5 
~A 
· Peters 'D· 
3 National· ' 
/e Zukunft der Volkerrec
htswissenschaft: Wider den
 epistemischen 
0. Scha ~smu~ (2007) 67 ZaiiRV72l. 
Ptofessi~ t~r, The In~isible College of!nternational Law
yers' (1977) 72 NULR 217: '[T)he 
dedicatedna commumty of in
ternational lawyers ... consti
tutes a kind of invisible colleg
e 
by Robe t ~a co~mon intellectual enterprise.' The exp
ression 'Invisible College' was
 used 
foundedr. oyle m 1646 in rel
ation to a predecessor society
 to the Royal Society which was 
'l'he New ~ 1 1660 (s:e R. Lomas, The Invisible C
ollege (London: Headline, 2002) 6
3; 
2002) Vol Xncyclopedta Britannica, 3
2 vols., 15th edn (Chicago: Encyclo
pedia Britannica, 
4 A · , 220. 
· kleinert 'V 
tnoderne N, 
0 ~ der Science Allemande zur Deutschen
 Physik. Nationalismus und
 
(1978) 6 F atu~wissenschaft in F
rankreich und Deutschland 
zwischen I914 und 1940' 
Gerrnan rancta 509. French
 authors deemed relativity an
d quantum theories as 'typica
l 
'La Scie mathematical-metaphysica
l delirium' (at 520 with reference to
 P. - J. Achahne, 
s nee des . il' ~ 
) 
P. Lenard CIV IS<:s et la s
cience allemande' (1916) 162 (autho
r's trans .. 
W. Me 'fe,utsche Physik in vier Biin
den, 2nd edn (Miinchen: Lehmann
, 1937-1941); 
29 Janu nze' Deutsche Phy
sik und jiidische Physik in 'Volki
scher Beobachter' of 
'Gerrna aryh 
19 ~6, .cited by Kleinert, 'V on der Science Allemand
e', n. 4, at 522, defined: 
delight 
11l YSics IS the experimental investigation of reality in non-living na
ture for the 
'Physik? observing its forms
 and processes' (author's trans.). In
 a presentation in 1935, 
Max PI Im kampf um die Weltans
chauung' ('Physics and the Battle fo
r World Views'), 
not ab} anck argued against this nati
onalisation of science and sta
ted: 'A science which is 
Presen: 
0
.r Willing to act beyond its own
 nation does not deserve its na
me' (author's trans.). 
11ortr" ation held in the Harna
ck-House, Berlin-Dahlem, o
n6 March 1935 in M. Planck,
 
age tmdE. 
'rtnncrungen, 5th edn (Stuttgart: Hi
rzel, 1949), 285, at 298. 
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International legal scholarship was also 'nationalised' (or 'regi_onai lised') in this way. The most important historical examples of regw~a approaches to international law are the Latin American6 and Sovte~ schools of international law? The heydays of a consciously an deliberately nationalised and even racialised international legal scholar-ship were again the National Socialist years. In the pamphlet 'The German Science of Public International Law' from 1939i Friedrich Berber claimed that 'the foundations of public internation\ law would be considered anew from the perspective of the Nationa Socialist worldview'. At the same time he declared that 'attempts bh foreigners, such as those by the French Fournier, ... to capture a German work on public international law in a rigid conceptual pattern appear pretty nalve'.8 An essay, 'The Influence of Jewish Theoretici~ns on German Teachings of Public International Law', said that Jewtsh legal thinking had emptied the nation, law, state, society, work, com· munity and so had transfigured those concepts to the point 'that the legal sciences - as a normative science aligned with Jewish thinking d were alienated from the German people' .9 Theses of this sort reach~ their peak in Carl Schmitt's closing words at a symposium on 'Jewry ill the Legal Sciences' in October 1936 in Berlin: 'A Jewish author has no authority for us, not even a "pure scientific authority"' .10 
• In opposition to such stances, anti-nationalist scholars time and agat~ insisted on and called for a de-nationalised quality of internationallega scholarship. The 19th-century Franz von Holtzendorff, for examp~e: sought to move from nationalised scholarship to 'civilized' scholarshiP· he pleaded to consider international legal scholarship not as 'a th~oryi devel~ped by ~in gular eminent author~ties on the basis of their natto~ad consciOusness, but as the product of a shared academic state of the mtn 
6 A. Alvarez, Le droit international americain: son fondement, sa nature d'apres l'histoi;~ d. l t' d ' d 
· (Par15• 
1p oma zque es etats u nouveau monde et leur vie politique et econormque Pedone, 1910) 13-21. 7 G. Ivanovich Tunkin, Theory of International Law, W.E. Butler trans. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974). 
33 
8 P. Berber, 'Deutsche Volkerrechtswissenschaft' (1939) 17 Geist der Zeit 731. 73Z, 7 (author's trans.). 
7) 
9 N. Gi.irke, 'Der EinfluB ji.idischer Theoretiker auf die deutsche Volkerrcchtslehre' (193 6 Das fudentum in der Rechtswissenschaft 5, 28 (author's trans.). 
. ' 
1° C S h 't 'D' d h 
h Gelst' 
. c ~~ t, 1e eutsc e Rechtswissenschaft im Kampf gcgen den ji.idisc en . a1 conclusiOn of the symposium of the Reich' s group of university teachers of the natiodn · 1' l k 
·n er 
soc1a 1st aw- eepers association from 3rd and 4th October 1936 'Das Judentum 1 • R h · h f' ( 
' ( thor 5 
ec tsw1ssensc at 1936) 41 Deutsche Juristenzeitung columns 1193, 1195 au trans.). 
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0
: civil~zed nations'. 11 This intellectual move is not appealing anymore; 
t e. claim of civilisational superiority does not seem much better than 
nat10nalism. Similarly, the search for a 'J'urisprudence' for a 'global corn-
m . ' Unity as called for by the New Haven scholars of the 20th century, up to 
th? 1990s still, I2 sounds false. It seems as if their protagonists fell prey to 
~;nstemic. nationalism, too, because their approach in many ways served 
S Amencan national interests. 
I So would a way out (and a path towards 'true' scholarship) lie in 'pure' 
~~al reasoning, as advocated by Kelsen in explicit opposition to scholar-
s lip driven by national interest?13 A radical detachment from one's 
n f a Ional background was also recommended by George Scelle who, in 
the ~ 930s, linked the surpassing of the national perspective to the object 
of .his discipline: 'Scientific objectivity must dispel ... every subjective 
romt of view and, in particular, ... every national point of view from 
1 
ega~ education .... The only ideal we should nurture is the objective of 
aw Itself, being an ideal in so far as it can never be attained: the creation 
of peace between human beings.'14 
Contradicting Scelle on this point, I suggest that it is not necessary that 
scholars of international law clinically strip off their 'national' point of 
I! 
P. Von Holtzendorff, 'Einleitung in das Vi:ilkerrecht' in F. van Holtzendorff (ed.), 
~andbuch des Volkerrechts: Auf Grundlage Europiiischer Staatenpraxis, 5 vols. (Berlin: 
12 abel, 1885), vol. I at 46 (author's trans., emphases added). 
H.D. Lasswell and M.S. McDougal, jurisprudence for a Free Society: Studies in law, science 
and Policy, 2 vols. (New Haven: New Haven Press, 1992), vol. I, xxii: 'The jurisprudence 
for Which we searched was one relevant, in its theories and intellectual procedures, for any 
community, including the global or earth-space community and all its component 
communities. A jurisprudence which stopped short with a single nation-state could 
13 scarcely be adequate in or for an interdependent world.' 
H. Kelsen, 'Preface to the First Edition' (New York: Rinehart, 1952), in H. Kelsen and 
R. Warren Tucker (eds.), Principles of International Law, 2nd edn (New Yor~: Holt, 
.
1967), at ix: ' ... I do so in opposition to a tendency wide-spread among wnters on 
~nter~ational law, who _ although they do not dare to deny the legal character and l~~nce 
he bmding force of this social order - advocate another than a legal, namely a pohtical, 
approach as adequate. This view is in my opinion nothing but an attempt to justify the 
non-application of the existing law in case its application is in conflict with some interest, 
or rather, with what the respective writer considers to be the interest of his state' (author's 
14 emphasis). 
G. Scel!e, Precis de droit des gens: Principes et systemati?ue, 2 v~ls. (Paris: _Re~~eil Sirey, 
~ 9 ;2), vol. I, ix: 'L'objectivite scientifique doit bannir dun ense1gnement JUfldique tout 
~deal extra-juridique toute 'croyance' toute aspiration affective, tout point de vue sub-
Je ff ' ' · t c 1 et, notamment, dans notre domaine, les points de vue nationaux -, tout sent1men 
e~lun mot, si eleve, si legitime ou si profond soit-il. Le seul ideal qu'on puisse contempler 
~est ~e "but", ideal aussi, puisque jam a is atteint, que se propose le Droit:!' etablissement de 
pa!x entre les hommes' (author's trans.). 
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1 · edin 
view. (Moreover, a complete Wertfreiheit is not attainable, as exp atn ke 
· lyma 
Section 5.3.2.) On the contrary, scholars can and should proactlVe hip use of their diverse national background by enriching their scholars with a comparative perspective. 
5.2.2 The Promise of Comparative International Legal Scholarship If epistemic nationalism were unsurmountable, it would consti~U~~ a serious obstacle for international legal scholarship. Epistem~c ~~ 10 of alism seems irreconcilable with scholarship because the regulatiVe.~ ea nt any scholarship or science is its epistemic universalism. (It is.~ dt erend matter that 'doing science' as a business is still typically pohttcallY a gh financially contained within the boundaries of the nation-state, th~ouce/ career paths, funding, etc.15) Epistemic universalism means t~at s.c 1 ~ 11 of scholarship is based on the postulate of a global inter-sub)ecttVlJ in research findings. Given certain premises and a particular metho. ' at principle anyone, regardless of sex, nationality or religion should arnve a-the same results. (Imagine a mathematical proof or a biological ob~erV 
_ 
tion which is only valid for Germans or Chinese.) Global tnter e b
. . . . 
. 
. 1 1 discours 
su Jechvtty m turn reqmres a transnational academ1c ega fit whose participants accept that arguments are sound only if they are for universal application. 
(if Such a genuine transnational discourse is possible, because scholars . c they are in good faith) are not doomed to remain trapped in epistem~e nationalism, for the following reasons. The first banal ground is tha.t t a1 subject matter of international legal scholarship, namely intern~tl~Il 
""' 
law, claims global validity, scope and relevance. Unlike domestiC a 's international law is formally applicable not only within one single s~ate 1 boundaries but in the whole world. Of course the origins of internat 1011 ~ law lie in the European state system that formed since the 16th ce~tu de and in the rules then applied throughout Europe ('droit pubhc her l'Europe')16• Simplistically put, these rules then were spread to ot 
15 
. 
d s sorliJl 
Cf. for tlm and for the term 'epistemic universalism' E. Crawford, T. Shinn an ' torY 
(eds.), 'The Nationalization and Denationalization of the Sciences: An Introduc 16 Essay' (1992) 16 Socio!ogy of' the ~c~ences 1, 2. 
.. er, proit 
G.B. de Mably, Le drort publrc del Europe (Geneva: Co. des Libr., 1776); J.L. ~\ub oit deS des gens moderne de !'Europe (Paris: Aillaud, 1819); G. F. von Martens, Pn!os dud~ and gens .moderne de !'Europe (Paris: Guillaumin, 1858). See A. von Bog,da»0J3) 73 S. Hmghofer-Szalkay, 'Das etwas unheimliche Ius Publicum Europaeum (2 ZaoHV209. 
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continents . 1 
Iessnes 'dtnam Y through comm
erce and war, accompanied by ru
th-
Which ~h an .arrogance, and by destruction of other legal cult
ures in 
hege ~t dissemination resulted. 17 As a result of this mor
e or less 
montal pro · · 1 
spans th . cess, mternahona
 law nowadays (at least in aspiration) 
T e entire globe. 
is w~~tobal ~at~re of international legal scholars' object of investigation 
of stu~ :ent~onzng because it is distinct form the purely national object
 
some Y arnmed by scholars of d
omestic law; the latter are therefor
e to 
nature e~~ent doo~ed to epistemic nationalism. Of course the 
global 
from d'ffi the 
0 ~Ject under study cannot prevent that it is examined 
ferent 
1 
erent (mduding different national) persp
ectives and with dif-
Persp ~ethodologies, but it at least allows for a universalisa
tion of 
legal se~rves. Add to this the 'globalising' socialisation of intern
ational 
to colJ c b olar~. In fact, the most influential scholars, who are accusto
med 
ICJ) w~ horattng (notably within institutions such as the ILC, IL
A or the 
tentiy ~t researchers and/or practitioners from other countries, c
onsis-
With . own play the relevance of nat
ional pre-understandings in dealin
g 
rnternati 11 
. . 
) IS 
But 1 ona 
aw as a scholar (or practrtwner . 
inter ~t us concede that this globalising socialisation, notab
ly within 
legal ~ahona! institutions, will never completely eclipse initial na
tional 
schola orrn~tton. The diverse national background of internati
onal legal 
on, 0 rs.wiiiiead the
m to rely on differing (national) case law
 they rely 
to d' n different domestic practice
 they know well, and will possibly le
ad 
IVertin 
. 
trend g assessments. Notably
, nationally coloured methodolog
ical 
clich ,
5 
can lead to the following dead e
nds: At the risk of overusing 
dicta~~~ We rn~g~t say that British pragmatism mi¥ht Jose its:lf in. unpre
-
casurstrcs, US legal realism runs t
he rrsk of endmg m legal 
17 
See ti 
(ign °~ an appraisal of the Eurocentrism of the writing of that history o
f international law 
0 flng to 
· 
com .. 
0 many other experiences and form
s of legal relatwns between autonomo
us 
expe~tlU!ties developed in the course of history and discarding such
 extra-European 
Tiences d fi 
f l . . d I . 
tion b an orms which wer
e discontinued as a result o c om
matwn an co omsa-
liisto y European Powers) B. Fassbender
 and A. Peters, 'Introduction: Tow
ards a Global 
the li~ofinternational Law' in B Fassbender and A. Peters (eds.),
 Oxford Har~dbook of 
1a tstory ,r1 '
 · 
See li L 
0J nternational Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 1-24. 
in I t · auterpacht, 'The So-calle
d Anglo-American and Continent
al Schools of Thought 
two n ernational Law' (1931) 12 BYIL 31, 
61: ' ... no substance in the view th
at there exist 
schools f · 
· 
d th C t' t I '· 
C . .R 0 International law - th
e Anglo-Amencan an e o
n men a . · · ' 
(ed )ousseau, 'Les conceptions national
es du droit des gens', in D. Ba
rdonnet et al. 
Ped~~e Le droit international: unite et diversite: Melanges offerts a Paul Re
uter (Paris: 
of Inter' 
19 ~l), 441, at 446; I. Brownlie, 'Remarks, Comparative Approaches to t
he Theory 
'rakes S natJ?nal Law' (1986) 80 ASILP 1
54-55; R.Y. Jennings, 'An Interna
tional Lawyer 
tock (1990) 39 ICLQ 513, 527. 
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scepticism, legal cynicism or even in the denial of international law, that French legal formalism threatens to turn into rigourism, and to lose touch with reality, that German legal idealism can develop into shee~ naivete, German doctrine into dogmatism, and so on. It is also ':ort 1 mentioning that the rise of English as the lingua franca of internatlOna f legal scholarship strengthens the impact of the 'Anglo-Saxon' style 0 reflection on internationallaw.19 At this point, the multinationality of the pool of international scholars turns into an asset. It is an asset because it allows individual scholars to learn from each other through reflexive acquisition of knowledge and so to renew themselves from within. Europe is particularly suited to ser:e a~ a 'laboratory'20 for the hybridisation of 'national' brands of internatlona legal scholarship, that is, for the mutual fertilisation of the different nationally permeated academic traditions. 
1 A related, maybe even more important asset of the various nationa backgrounds of international legal scholars is that this diversity alloW~ the actors to enrich their international legal scholarship by eleme~ts 01 comparative law, which thus may become 'comparative internatlo~a legal scholarship', and thereby become more powerful. The comparau~e approach, analysing national practice, will allow better to identify a tru Y international legal corpus of rules on a particular international proble: at hand. Take, as a first example, national court decisions. These ma~ ht relevant for the formation of international customary law, they mlg 1 constitute 'subsequent practice' for the interpretation of internationa treaty law, and they are a' subsidiary means for the determination of rule~ of [international] law' (Art. 38(l)(d) Statute of the International Court 0 Justice). Collecting and comparing national court decisions is therefor~ an important task of international legal scholars that can be perfonne properly only with some knowledge of the domestic systems. d Second, legal comparison plays a traditional (albeit a limited a~ technical) role in the examination of the general principles of law.::. terms of Art. 38(1)(c) Statute of the International Court of Justl General principles of law became prominent in EU-law- the develoP£ ment of European administrative law and the European Charter ~ Fundamental Rights fed particularly on the comparison and syntheslS 
19 
. 
'thitfor 
See on the. Importance oflanguage, its mastery and the cultural baggage coming Wl re, the evolution of international criminal law scholarship M. Bohlander, 'Language, cultU Legal Traditions, and International Criminal Justice' (2014) 3}IC}l-23. 
·0 11 
20 M D l M ' 
c 0 deri " 
· e mas- arty, Comparative Law and International Law: Methods 1or r Pluralism' (2006) 3 Tyo JLP 43. 
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of relevant . . 1 
the m b prmcrp es of administrative 1aw
21 and fundamental rights in 
gener er ~r s~ates 22 • In international criminal law and criminal procedure, 
Com a P~mcrples of law have grown in their practical significance.
23 
the u P~rattve .Jaw also has something to say in the controversy surrounding 
Ping nrversalrsm or relativism of human rights to 
identify any 'overlap-
consensus' here. 
be ~h~rd aspect compelling comparisons is that international law must 
enfo p emented by the states themselves due to 
the lack of a central 
legitrcer~en~ mechanism. Therefore, international Jaw must rely on 'local 
to op;at~on · 24 Actors must know about JocaJlegal traditions if they are 
F Inllse their use of this resource of legitimacy. 
ov:erour~h, many phenomena with a global scope (ranging from pollution 
rnrg r black b ra ton to terrorism) are caused not by states (under
stood as 
Glob 1. o~es), but by political an
d private actors within states. 
tions ~Isatron in that sense has, and this is banal, intensified the interac-
ance. ;tween th~ n~tional and international levels, ofJa:V and g~v~rn­
inter ~e globahsatwn of national law and the multtculturahty of 
resol natronallaw are eo-constitutive and interdep
endent. Attempts to 
act Ve any global problems with help of internation
al law must therefore 
and upon the situation within the state. Therefor
e, those who create 
cond· ~Pply international law must know domestic framework-
F Ihons very well. 
regi or a~l of these reasons, knowledge about different national legal 
law rnes Interacting with and eo-constituting the b
ody of international 
~a tse;~s increasingly important. Along this line, Mireille Delmas-
tha; ~ Ernmanuelle Jouannet,26 and Anthea Roberts27 have suggested 
thi ki e study of the various legal regimes, traditions and le
gal ways of 
n ng, as well as methods of legal comparison, sho
uld be integrated 
~~ 
J. Schw M arze, European Administrative Law, 2nd edn (Lon
don: Thomson/Sweet & 
22 axweu, 2006) ~3 Art. 6 Tre t · ) See IC aY on European Union, OJ 2008, No. C 115/01 (EU Treaty. 
pa TY, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T Furundzjia (10 December 1998), 
para. 178; Art. 21 
1 /~· l(c) Rome Statute of the Inter~ational Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, in force 
24 
L . .A.u 6 2 ~ 02 • 2187 UNTS 90 (Rome Statute). . 
An·, btora, 'Toward an Auspicious Reconciliati
on of International and Comparative 
25 Det yses' (1998) 46 AJCL 669, 680. 
26 mas-Mart 'C 
. I L ' 20 
E. Jo y, omparative Law and Internatwna aw , n. · 
lnt uannet, 'French and American Perspectives on
 International Law: Legal Cultures and 
27 ernatio 1 
.A. Ro na Law' (2006) 58 Mai LR 291, 333. 
. 
E~forb~rts, 'Comparative International Law? The Role ofNational Courts in Creatmg and 
cmg International Law' (2011) 60 ICLQ 57. 
126 
ANNE PETERS 
into the study of international law. International legal scholars need~~~: comparatists, and the diversity of national backgrounds helps thdelll stic 2s 
· s ome 
so. Importantly, scholars need not only compare the van~u estiC solutions in a 'horizontal' manner, but also look 'vertically at dolll l d . . 11 29 aw an mternatwna aw. 
that In response to the charge of epistemic nationalism, we might s~Y tyles the variety of national legal and academic cultures and of research s the on international law is not necessarily fatal but - on the co~trary 
-
11 as ing 
potential to enrich research in international law worldwtde by a oW ent for 'comparative international legal scholarship'. The acknowl:dge~egal and discussion of real-world epistemic nationalism in internat~ona ely research can help pursuing the regulative idea of any scholarshtp, na~ely epistemic universalism. This does not require scholars to coll1P ~ich detach themselves from their education and cultural context (w ke would be impossible and unnecessary), but demands that they ma a conscious effort to internalise the 'others' perspectives. 
5.3 Charge No. 2 
5.3.1 The Problem of Ideology 
·n 
Epistemic nationalism is just one facet of the problem of ideology ~f scholarship. 'Ideology' is here employed in the negative sen~e ate a manipulative belief system that claims to embody general and ulUJllmic truths and values, while camouflaging political and ~eo~~ ies self-interest. In the field of international law most relevant 1deo ~ JJl are political ideologies such as liberalism, s~cialism, cosmopolita~l~al and the like. The charge of ideology is that (much) of internation~l e 011 scholarship has an 'ideological nature', with its findings depending 30 'political preferences remaining concealed', instead ofbeing laid open· 
d be best 
28 For scholarly observers, it is an open question whether such comparison shoul king 
d d · ,. d · ' c 1 · 
t'ce and see ' 
co~ ucte m an m uct!Ve 1as 11on, st~rting from the inchoate court ~rac 1 
_ 'deduce 
to 1solate the lowest common denommator, or whether it should - mversely ctiolt 
rules from more abstract principles (such as the primacy of human rights pror both 
acknowledged in the international legal system). Probably a combined approac·~ed bY bottom up and top down, that is, an examination of state (court) practice gttl·fy and principles in the style of a 'better law' approach is warranted in order to identl develop international law. 
l fot 
29 Cf A. Momirov and A. Naude Fourie, 'Vertical Comparative Law Methods: 'foo 5 Conceptualising the International Rule of Law' (2009) 2 EtR 291. 
3 EJIL 
30 I. Feichtner, 'Realizing Utopia through the Practice of International Law' (20lZ) 2 
1143, 1154. 
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A recent pa e , . 
could tu P r was ammated ... by the conce
rn that legal scholarship 
rn out to be th' h . 
. 
ruling r'd 1 
. 3 
no mg more t an the pseudo-obJective defence
 of 
T eo ogres.' 1 
he problem f 'd I 
system) 0 1 eo ogy (the pervasiveness of a specific p
olitical belief 
'positivi ~:e~s ~xacerbated in scholarship that is 'idealist' (as opposed to 
norma]] s ' reahst', or 'critical'). In fact 'idealism' or even 'u
topianism' is 
charact Y. used as a pejorative term both by 'realists'
32 and by critics, 33 to 
in reali ense c~~tain ~cademic methods on the on the ground that these are 
Vists', a( (~ohtrcal) rdeology. The third group of anti-idealists, the 'positi-
tionaii so. enounced a 'tendency wide-spread am
ong writers on interna-
this by aw. ~ 0 produce 'political ideology'.34 Hans Kelsen sought to escape 
c0111111 Wnttng books 
of a 'purely juristic character'. 35 In his foreword to the 
'with t~n~ary on the UN Charter of 1950, he stressed that this work dealt 
internat~ aw of the Organisation, not with its actual or desired role in the 
Present ~~nal play of powers. Separation of law from politics in the 
a ton of national or international problems is possib1
e.'36 
I 5.3.2 The Promise of Political Implications 
n contrast t 
nowada d 0 what Kelsen believed and what
 he aspired to do, it is 
ys oubted that it works to purge international 
legal scholarship 
3! 
J. Von B 
3z Law ande~nsl~o.rff: 'International Legal Scholarsh
ip as a Cooling Medium in International 
See forth 
0 ~hcs (2014) 25 E!lL 977, 977-78. 
attempt e VIew that interwar political science w
as 'idealist'/'utopian', and an erroneous 
3 
The Tw to transfer '19th century liberalism' to 
international relations: E.H. Carr, 
3 Dsing /nty Ye~rs' Crisis 1919-1939 (London: MacMillan, 1948), 8, 11, 40 and
 passim. 
how n oncret: International legal problems, nota
bly M. Koskenniemi has sought to show 
'apolo ?r~~-onented ('idealistic'/'utopist') argumentation and fact-oriented 
('realist'/ 
of the ~Ist argumentation either merge or are self-defeating or contradictory
. Because 
cannot ben. struc~ure of legal argumentation, says Koskenniemi, public intern
ational law 
resolv 1 
e Investigated scientifically. Hence, internation
al legal questions can only be 
co 1 wic~~othrough conscious or unconscious resort to (necessarily controversial) polit
ical 
and p ns (M. Koskenniemi 'The Politics oflnternational
 Law' (1990) 1 EJIL 4, 7, 9, 12 
assim) s ' .
 s .r 
Inter . · ee further Martti Koskenniemi, Fr
om Apology to Utopta: The tmctt~re O; 
D rr natronal Legal Argumerrt Znd edn (New York· Cambr
idge University Press, 2005); 
, · ''-enned I ' 
· 
) A C 
Crit' . I y, nternational Legal Structures (Baden-Baden
: Nomos, 1987 ; · arty, 
2 EJI!Lca International Law· Recent Trends in the T
heory of International Law' (1991) 
34 B 66-96. · 
· Kelsen 'p f: 1 
· · K 1 ' 
approacJ ' re ace', n. 13, at ix. See for the 
ideal of science unt e~pmnmg , e sen s 
25 EJIL 1 A. Orford, 'Scientific Reason and the Dis
cipline of International Law (2014) 
Js !bid 369, 377-79. 
36 • 
B. Kelsen Th 
) .. · ( h · del d) 
' e Law of the United Nations (London: Stevens, 1950 , vw emp 
asiS a e · 
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. 1 h 1 rs are to 
of politics. It is wtdely accepted that mternat10nal lega se 0 a ning some extent political actors, too. Martti Koskenniemi at the ope e in conference of the European Society of International Law in Flo:~nc but 2004 put it as follows: '[T}he choice is not between law and poht~s~ not between one politics oflaw, and another. Everything is at stake, ~·stin· for everyone. And how to distinguish? Well, in the same way w~ 1 bit guish between kitsch and non-kitsch.m This statement may el ~egal blunt, so let us look at the factors which 'politicise' internattOna scholarship one by one. 
rtical The first factor is that the object of their studies is itself ~ po~eorg matter, maybe even 'power in disguise' as hard-core reah~t ore Schwarzenberger called it.38 A more moderate (and in my vteW ~ing appropriate view) is that international law is the 'result from the blen of ethics and power' .39 
on 
International law is political, not only because of its dependence ost political power, but also because it transports political values. 'fh~~nd influential academic schools of our time, the New Haven Schoo·ff ent Critical Legal Studies,41 have both, although with quite dt e;ing arguments, insisted on this point, and have not become tired of un:~~ of through ever new examples the pretences of neutrality and techntcl international law as a chimaera. 
erts Secondly, legal scholars are political because they are ex?~rts; EZ~her, are not technical, neutral, non-ideological, in short 'unpohtlcal. ~a lfis what is going on is the 'politics of expertise'.42 '(F}or knowled~e 1
.tseigbt a power', as Francis Bacon43 put it. Michel Foucault gave thts 1115 37 M K k . . 'I t t' l L . E B T d' . d Renewal' (2005) 
. os enmemt, n erna 10na aw m ,urope: etween ra JtiOn an 16 EJIL 113, 123. 
. Stevens, 
38 G. Schwarzenberger, Power Politics: A Study of World Society, 3rd edn (London. ernacY 1964), 199, 202-03: 'the primary function oflaw is to assist in maintaining the suP{ ticS in of force and the hierarchies established on the basis of power ... power po 1 disguise'. 
. 1948), 
39 G. Scelle, Manuel de droit international public (Paris: Domat-Montch~e~uen. 6: 'Les regles de droit viennent de la conjonction de l'ethique et du pouvolf · (OJt.f0 rd: 
4° Cf. R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It be made 
Clarendon Press, 1994), vi: 'I try to show that there is an unavoidable choice to tiooal 
between the perception of international law as a system of neutral rules, and intern~ues'. law as a system of decision-making towards the attainment of certain declared va 
41 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, n. 32. 
d the 
42 D. Kennedy, 'The Politics of the Invisible College: International Governance a~ Rule: Politics of Expertise' (2001) 5 EHRLR 463, 463; D. Kennedy, 'Challenging E:x.per The Politics of Global Governance' (2005) 5 Syd LR 5. 
1597), 
43 F. Bacon, Mediationes Sacrae (London: Excusum impensis Humfredi Hooper, chapter 11, 'Of Heresies', at M4 (with regard to God). 
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a different twi t· th b' . 
are the s · e o ~echves of knowledge and the objective
s of power 
same·' · kn . 
Finall h. : · · m .owmg we control, and 
in controlling we know'.
44 
Value ju~' t e mternahonallegal scholar is a political actor because her 
cornpo gements normally carry political 
implications. Values are one 
· nent of h 
. 
. 
'I'he Wert . anJ se oiarly treatment 
of mternatwnal law. 
the Pre . urtezlsstreit 
5 
and the Positivismusstreit
46 have done away with 
VIouslych . h db I' f . 
'I'he q . ens e e 1e that science a
nd values could be separated. 
uestiOn b fi h d 
. 
Pronou e ore a only been whe
ther the academic should 
l96os t~ce a value judgement or not. After the Positivismusstreit of the 
abilit; of e ~roblem is now conceived the other way round: The sever-
longer w~c~nce and values has been called into question. The issue is no 
the cont et er the scholar should pronounc
e a value judgement but, on 
lllostly ~ary, whether she can actually abstain from doing so. The answer 
actiVity given tod~y is that she cannot. A complete value-free academic 
interpretappears Impossible, because any k
ind of statement and any 
lnternar ation are pre-structured by the
 speaker's Vorverstiindnis. 
does no:onai legal scholarship is 'value-free' 
only in the sense that it 
(about la g)enerate the (legal) norms but only statem
ents about norms 
0 w. 
expr~sts?e other hand, it is not the primary purpose of scholarship to give Ion to 1 
a llliddie va ues. International legal sch
olars should therefore find 
OVertfi 'hground between the unrealistic postulate of 
value-freedom 
rez eit) d an unbounded evaluation.47 When these values are 
44 
G. Gutting 'M· 
http://st [. tchel Foucault' Stanford Encyclopedi
a of Philosophy (2008), available from 
12 Decea\ord.library.usyd.edu.au/archives/
fall2008/entries/foucault/ (last checked on 
A. Sheridm er 2016); M. Foucault, Discipline and 
Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 
Inutuaj an (trans.) (New York: Random House, 1975),
 170-77. Foucault analysed the 
co-const't · 
al) b · · 
Prisons 1 utton of knowledge and p
ower with regard to (visu o servatton m 
45 been rec a~ a means of exercising 'disciplinary' power, but his wri
ting on this point has 
Accord· etved as a more general insight by later l
egal (notably critical legal) scholarship. 
rules of~~ ~ 0 .Max Weber, 'jurisprudence ... ascertains what is valid according to th
e 
establisl drtsttc thought, which is compos
ed partly of logic and partly of framework
s 
· 
le by c · 
' · d f 
Interpret . onventton. Thus it determin
es tifcertain legal rules am' certam mo es o 
atton 
· f h l 
Precisely h are to be seen as binding. 
It does not answer the questiOn o w et te
r 
to succ ~ ese rules should be created. Jurisprudence can only declare that, if one w
ishes 
0 llr leg:t ' then this legal rule is the suitable
 way of doing so according to the norms of
 
111. John (system'. M. Weber, 'Science as a Vocation', i
n M. Weber, Science as a Vocation, 
· 
tran ) p 
( h · 
46 In the 0 •• ' s. • · Lassman et a1
 (eds) (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 3, 19 emp as1
s 
, S rtgma)) . 
ee}l l\.1 · 
4) (l\Teu~ied~us and F. Flirstenberg ( eds.), Der Positivismusstreit in der deuts
chen Soziologie 
L. llngi, 'W;uchterhand, 1969). 
, . 
. . 
25, 25. ssenschaft und Werturteil- Wi
ssenschaft und Politik (2009) 4 Ancdla IUrtS 
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reflected and laid open and not sold as scientific insights, the reliance otne fl · wro 
such values does not damage the scholarly character of re ectwn,, 1 t Max Weber.
48 Antonio Cassese says along the same lines: Wlad 
. r 'tan 
matters, ... is that he or she [the scholar] should make 1t exp lCl d ·n clear that the choice between two conflicting values is grounde 1 f a personal slant or bias, and not in any "objective" legal prec~denct ~ 0 one value over the other'.49 It remains however exceedingly dtfficu t k follow that recommendation to make transparent one's ideational bae · ground in real life scholarship. 
5.3.3 The Promise of Normative (as Opposed to 'Positive') Analysis 
The dangers of ideology seem greater when scholars engage. i~ a normative analysis of international law. Such a normative analysts 11 rejected by traditional legal positivists, who demand that internation~ legal scholarship should occupy a 'role [only] as a supernumera~ and chronicler'. 50 It is also rejected by contemporary neo- Kelsenianist~ :~d by the hard-core law and economics school. For example, Goldsmtth Posner deplore that 'theorizing often fuels, and is overtaken by, norma· tive speculation about improving internationallaw'.52 
·fie In opposition to that stance, this section seeks to show that speel. e features of international law, notably its openness and dynamics, requ!r e a normative analysis of the law and of its applications. By 'normatlV analysis', I mean justifying or criticising existing norms, making refor~ proposals, evaluating the application of the law and criticising sued practice.53 Because of the leeway inherent in any interpretation an 
s ;al 
48 M. Weber, '"Objectivity" in Social Sciences', in M. Weber, The Methodology of the oc Sciences, E. A. Shils and H. A. Finch (trans., eds.) (New York: Free Press, 1949), 49· 49 A. Cassese, Five Masters of international Law (Oxford: Hart, 2011), 259. d nd 
5° C. Hillgruber, 'Braucht das Volkerrecht eine Volkerrechtstheorie?' in M. Jestae \;zt 0. Lepsius (eds.), Rechtswissenschaftstheorie (Tiibingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 113, a (author's trans.). 
of 
51 See critically on creeping law-making by scholars from the perspective of a pure theo%1)' law J. Kammerhofer, 'Law-Making by Scholarship? The Dark Side of 21st c~n s of International Law "Methodology"' in J. Crawford and S. Nouwen (eds.), Proceedrng the European Society of International Law 3 (Oxford: Hart, 2010), 115. ford 52 J. Landman Goldsmith and E.A. Posner, The Limits of International LaW (OX University Press, 2005), 15. 
d IJliC 
53 Such a normative analysis was, for example, performed by scholars and aca e and institutions who analysed the application of the rules concerning the use of force who the Security Council by the US and British government in the spring of 2003• 
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application of 1 
sense of a th a ru e to ~he facts, any evaluatio
n oflegal practice is, in the 
analysis. eory of SCien
ce, a 'normative' and not 
merely a 'positive' 
5.3.3.1 Th 
Nor . e Inevitabili
ty and Desirability of Norm
ative Analysis 
. illahve anal . . . 
. 
~deaJ-tyPicail ~SI.s Is .IneVItable to s?~e exten~. 
~!though it can be 
onJy' d . Y dtstmgutshed f
rom positive analysts m w
hich the law is 
escnbed 1 . d 
a blurred . ' exp ame
 and prognosticated, th
ere is in reality 
a constru I~termediate zone. First, because 'descripti
on' is in itself already 
distincti c Ive and systema
tic performance, which is b
ased on numerous 
the Peri odns and choices. The
 'observer' must choose the a
ctors, the acts, 
b o s of exa . 
t' d h 
o server' , 
mma ton, an e mus
t interpret texts. In all this
, the 
descripti;n ( ~o~mative') preconceptions pre-structure 
her 'positive' 
econ0ll1. · 
1hts blurred zone has been w
ell described by a law and 
law: '[T]~s scholar who in principle insists on posi
tive analysis of the 
own ide 1 e responsib
ility of scholars is to illumin
ate, not to promote their 
advocac a. s. On ~he other hand, good scholarship hold
s great promise for 
obscure ylll for. It can clarify 
causal relationships that 
are otherwise 
"'h · ununation is not neutra
l '54 
! e se d 
. 
be avo 'd c~~ reason why normative analysis of in
ternational law cannot 
sions a~de b ts the typical indeterminacy and vagueness 
of treaty provi-
doubt h Y a large numbe
r of unwritten norms. Ther
efore, much more 
Which . avers over the ex
istence of the lex lata than 
in domestic law, 
and d Is relatively fully and
 precisely codified in the form
 of codes, laws, 
ecrees I dd' · · 
· 
d d 11 fi 
Out of ft · n a Itlon, mt
ernatwnallaw has evolve 
gra ua y, o ten 
a hard so law texts. The ex
act point of change from a pr
e-legal practice to 
these rule of internationa
l customary law can hardly
 be pinpointed. For 
reasons . h 
. 
. 
nor elll . . 'neit er the c
anons of construction for tre
aty mterpretatwn 
selves ~lrlcal research on the formation of customa
ry law will in them-
live ( Yteld dear results. The find
ings must be complemente
d by norma-
evaiuar ) 
I'fy 
a Practic tve considera
tions. For example, it mak
es sense to qua t 
endur· e and the accomp
anying opinio iuris as suffic
iently general and 
~ith t~:~ When t~e legal norm identified thereby is ove:all in
 co~formity 
tlona)l nter~atiOnallegal system and in har
mony wtth other mterna-
egal Pnnciples. As Anton
io Cassese put it, 'the critic
al positivist 
highJ• 1ghted tl 
s1 and that the lat these rules l
1ad been misinterpreted and 
dis.torte~ by the po~itical actors 
J.f'. T:r h Y could not serve as 
a proper legal basis for the m
vas10n of Iraq m 2003. 
lrni\'er a.c hnan, The Econo
mic Structure of International La
w (Cambridge: Harvard 
SJty Pre 
ss, 2008), 4 (emphasis added). 
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. r ht should feel free ... critically to appraise the rule or institution : · ·, ~ tg of the ... general values upheld in the international commumty · f Finally, a normative analysis is desirable, as the historical experienc~ 0 t the defencelessness of the 'pure' scholarship of internati?~~lla": agatn~e ideological modification of the law shows. 'Pure' postttvtsm maY .0 deemed to involve a logical and moral ban or impediment to lawye~. 1 d the fight against authoritarian regimes'.56 Notably during th~ T try Reich, many German international legal scholars did not votce ~ y critique. Instead of pointing out violations of internatio~al law, t ~y subscribed to a National Socialist doctrine of internatwnal laW which the norms were modified and adapted to ideology.57 • t A dilemma is that while the early 20th-century legal positivism dt~ 00 f erect a bulwark against Nazi scholarship, a more 'normative' analysts (od whatever flavour) is not per se better. 'Nazi lawyers themselves conduc~et­a normative analysis of the law, by criticising and interpreting the e~t~ts ing law from the perspective of the new V olksgemeinschaft an . \ assumed general values'; in some sense there was 'too much nonnatt~; in Nazi legal scholarship'.58 However, it was the legal positivists' cla.1 h that there is no necessary connection between law and morality, whtC may have facilitated National Socialism to fill the law with their contents~ And then, legal positivism by definition required legal scholars to ~ccepy and work with the existent ('posited') law, however morally wrong tt ma have been. 
In our times, too, purely positive analysis has engendered a fals~ security. Because of the openness of international norms, it is.often ;~ 0 really clear what their contents are. In this situation, states will ten assert rules which are in their favour (and thereby set up their ow~ version of international law) or they will do what they want. 
55 S . h" 
. 
. . f th neglect of 
ee m t IS sense Cassese, Fzve Masters, n. 49, at 259. Cf. for a cnhque o e . the taking into account general principles: H. Lauterpacht, The Function of LaW ~~ions Int~rnatio~al Community (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), 438: 'the desire of !:\ene~~tates of mternat10nallawyers to confine their activity to a registration of the practice 0 tio!l has discouraged any attempt at relating it to a higher legal principle, or to d1e concep of international law as a whole'. 56 Cassese, Five Masters, n. 49, Preface, at viii. 
with 
57 See D.F. Vagts, 'International Law in the Third Reich' (1990) 84 AJIL 661 references. 
58 Bernstorff, 'International Legal Scholarship' n. 31 at 983. 
. the 
59 
' ' 
·cs Iil 
W. Twining,'!'_· Farnsworth, S. Vogenauer, and F. Tes6n, 'The Role of Acade!UII Studies Legal System m P. Cane and M. Tushnet (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Lega (Oxford University Press, 2003), 920, at 942, 945. 
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The ""'e 'd "' re es . . , 
by schol I cnptton of such leg
al claims and practice of governm
ents 
ar Y observers is then to some ext
ent random. 
'rh S.3.3.2 The Feasib
ility of Normative Analysis 
un~j~~r~~tive .analysis we need is feasible without (deliberately
 or 
en011 i ng.y sellmg em
erging norms for law as it stan
ds. That phenom-
becau s ~despread in international legal scholarship, la
st but not least 
featurse t e boundary between
 law and not-yet-law, due to t
he special 
es of th · · 
. 
labellin e mternatronal le
gal process, rs unclear. The p
remature 
terms l of merely emerging norms as valid law is in methodological 
norm /Wed because it mixes 
(beyond what is inevitable) positive a
nd 
of int a rve analysis. Moreover, 
it risks undermining the normat
ive power 
the e;rnationallaw as a whole
. When the legal scholar wrongly
 asserts 
witho~:tence o~ a ~egal norm she usurps the position o
f a law-maker 
" normative JUstification. 
60 
.l'lS long 1 1 
relyin as . e~a scholars mark where 
they make an evaluation (by 
order)g on prmcrples with some anc
horage in the international legal
 
the le 'tnd as long as they signal
 what is, according to their an
alysis, 
fully ex ~a, and what they request de lege ferenda, a norm
ative analysis 
rope wo~ orms to scholarly standards. Louis Henkin d
escribed the tight-
tion of\ between methodolog
ically sound, but still creative re
construc-
Wishftl t h~ law and unscho1ar1y juris-fiction as follows: 
'I don't trust the 
ough/t tbr~kers, I don't trust those who say "this is th
e law because it 
what th 
0 
e · But I support those, and I am
 one of those, who say "this is 
what e law ought to be, and whe
ther I'm not sure it's not, let me
 see to 
evalu e~tent it is maybe, or can be made to be!'".
61 In this form (as an 
ll!atr'vatrve systematisation and 
an evaluative closure of legal g
aps), nor-
e anal · · 
nation 1 y
srs rs not only a methodologica
lly sound element of inter-
indis a legal scholarship in
 the sense of 'nice to have
' but an 
of th~~~able part of it. Normative analysis is necessary, e
xactly because 
of th .rn erent graduality of th
e international legal process an
d because 
law e Indeterminacy of treaty la
w. These typical features of inte
rnational 
clearPrevent, as explained, the 
purely positive analysis from g
enerating 
cho and unequivocal results. A
nd because states can then mor
e or less 
ose th . 
lill!it . e Interpretation of 
the law that suits them best, 
the auto-
standat,Ion. of scholars to 'descr
iption' of the law and legal pra
ctice 'as it 
s ' wrU make it even easier for 
states to disregard internationa
l Jaw 
60 
61 ~:s~~:cki~lg) authority of scholars to make law will be explained in Section 5.5.2. 
'Ftve Masters, n. 49, at 197. 
/ 
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under cover of law. On the premise that such breaches of international 
law are undesirable, normative analysis (which more easily than positive 
analysis uncover these breaches) is necessary. 
To conclude, the perils of (political) ideology can be met by scholars 
consciously and proactively espousing it as a challenge.62 The problems 
can hardly be avoided by concentrating on seemingly value-free 'positive' 
analysis. Instead, scholars might acknowledge that an ambivalence 
between normative and positive analysis characterises international 
legal scholarship, and that this ambivalence embodies a tension which 
can be productive. 
5.4 Charge No. 3 
5.4.1 The Problem of Unscholarliness and Recurring Attempts 
of 'Scientification' of the Discipline 
The contemporary critique of ideology and national bias, often coupled 
with scepticism vis-a-vis all 'normative' approaches, frequently goes hand-
in-hand with the charge of 'unscholarliness'. The critique is that legal 
academics dealing with international law often (or even inevitably) lacks 
a scholarly (or 'scientific') character, and therefore does not really deserve 
the label 'scholarship' (or even 'science', to use the Germanicism). 
Such critique is implied or explicitly voiced by proponents of the 
ongoing 'empirical turn'63 of international legal scholarship. Those 
favouring an economic approach to international law have submitted 
that 'international legal scholarship lacks a progressive research 
program'.64 For the proponents of law and economics, the unscholarly 
character of much legal research is due to the failure to distinguish 
between description and prescription. As a remedy, law and economics 
recommends to use certain 'more promising economic methodologies, in 
terms of their capacity to generate a progressive research program that 
62 Along the same line, Jochen von Bernstorff has asked for a 'self-reflected scholarly 
operation, which acknowledges its political character ... scholarship should make trans-
parent from a reflexive distance which particular political or economic projects [his or 
her] methodologies may serve in a given research context'. Bernstorff, 'International Legal 
Scholarship', n. 31, at 984. 
63 G. Shaffer and T. Ginsburg, 'The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship' 
(2012) 106 AJIL 1. 
64 J.L. Dunoff and J.P. Trachtmann, 'Economic Analysis of International Law' (1999) 24 
YJIL 1, 3. 
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might usefully address persistent international law problems',65 and of 
. . . . 66 
course quantitative empmcs. 
That 'new scientism'67 which has taken hold in the discipline of 
international law is actually less radical or unusual than it appears at 
first sight. In fact, all historical 'paradigm shifts' can be read as attempts at 
the scientification of the authors' engagement with internationallaw.68 
Thus, in the 17th and 18th centuries, a secularised natural law was 
mobilised against theologically based natural law, with reference to 
mechanics, mathematics and the natural sciences.69 Thomas Hobbes 
compared the investigation of the law of the state to dismantling 
a clock to understand the functions of the constituent pieces and 
wheels.70 Samuel Pufendorf prided himself on having worked out the 
first science of natural law and public internationallaw.71 Christian Wolff 
65 Ibid., 4. 66 See on empirical approaches also below Section 5.6.3.1. 
67 H. Hongjuh Koh, 'The 1994 Roscoe Pound Lecture: Transnational Legal Process' (1996) 
75 Neb LR 181, 190. 
68 Sec also Orford, 'Scientific Reason', n. 34, at 369: 'the status of international law as an 
academic discipline has been intimately connected with the capacity of international 
lawyers to demonstrate that our discipline is properly scientific. Yet the ideals of science 
upon which international lawyers have drawn in seeking to demonstrate the scientific 
nature of our work have not remained static.' For an overview of the schools of interna-
tional law, see the focus section of 44 (2001) GYIL 25-201. See also S. R. Ratner and 
A.M. Slaughter (eds.), 'Symposium on Method in International Law' (1999) 93 AJIL 291. 
69 From the secondary literature, see D. von Stephanitz, Exakte Wissel!schaft urzd Recht: Der 
Eirzflufl vorz Naturwisserzschaften und Mathematik auf das Rechtsderzken urzd 
Rechtswisserzschaft irz zweieirzhalb ]ahrtauserzderz. Ein historischer Grurzdrifl (Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 1970), 69-72, 84-92, 170; A. Dufour, 'Le paradigme scientifique dans la pensee 
juridique moderne' in P. Amselek (ed.), Tluforie du droit et science (Paris: Presses Univ. de 
France, 1994), 147, at 154, 160 with further references. 'C'est ... surtout chez Pufendorf 
que le nouveau paradigme physico-mathematique de la pensee juridique moderne trou-
vera sa premiere expression privilegiee ... Pufendorf finit-il par epouser dans le De Jure 
Naturae et Gerztiumde 1672 l'inflechissement demonstratif donne a la methode 
mathematique et du meme coup !'ideal cartesien d'une science decoulant tout entiere 
d'un principe fondamental d'une certitude absolue.' (Ibid., 158, 161). 
70 T. Hobbes, Orz the Citizen 10, R. Tuck and M. Silverthorne (trans., eds.) (Cambridge 
University Press, 1998): 'For a thing is best known from its constituents. As in an 
automatic Clock or other fairly complex device, one cannot get to know the function or 
each part and wheel unless one takes it apart, and examines separately the material, shape 
and motion of the parts, so in investigating the right of a commonwealth and the duties of 
its citizens, there is a need, not indeed to take the commonwealth apart, but to view it as 
taken apart .. .'. 
71 
'Those who busily investigate the make-up of natural bodies do not consider it sufficient 
to inspect only the external appearances that immediately meet the eye at a first glance; 
rather, they also make extraordinary efforts to probe those bodies more deeply and to 
analyze them into their component parts ... The same path has been taken by those 
concerned to examine carefully the character of the most prominent moral body, namely 
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. thet11atic.U 
succeeded Hobbes and Pufendorf in the phys1co-ma pired to 
paradigm.72 In the course of the 19th century? 3 others as 
a 'natural science of law'74 or a 'biology of law' 75 
radigJ.11 
At least since the end of the 19th century, the natural :aw-f~awrers, was dismissed as speculative and tmscholarly?6 Internat~onal 
of 1928 
such as Dionisio Anzilotti, in his Corso di diritto internazwna: esearch 
sought to preserve the scholarly character of international leg~ r on the 
using the methods of legal positivism: the strict con~entratl~~ 
olitical 
positive rules of public international law, to the excluston °~ ~ ~n gans 
and ethical considerations.77 This approach reached its het.g t ·~catioil· Kelsen' s Pure Theory of Law, with the explicit objective of sclentl the \W 
In his foreword to the already mentioned commentary on . ristiC -
Charter of 1950, Kelsen stressed that these works embodied 'a JU tional 
not a political, approach' to the United Nations and other interna 
wedl1 'dl (trans.) ne 
the state.' S. Pufendorf, Dissertatio de statu hominum naturali, M. Set er 
of the Latin text (Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen Press, 1990), 109. 
·nis natura 
1 
1 
72 See C. Wolff, Institutiones Juris Naturae et Gentium, in quibus ex ipsa hon~agdeburg: 
continua nexu omnes obligationes et iura omnia deducuntur (Halle an~ t d works) 
Renger, 1750), preface (repr. in 26 C. Wolff, Gesammelte Werke (Col ec e 
Praefatio, 1-5, M. Thomann (ed.), F. Nicolai (trans.)). 
't dal'ls la 
73 
• 
11 et drot 
. et 
1 
From the secondary literature, see R. M. Kiesow, 'Science nature e 
. du drott 
deuxieme moitie du XIXieme siecle en A\lemagne' in P. Amselek, Theorte b'ologisrr" 
science (Paris: Leviathan 1994), 187-210, at 187, with numerous references to ~tury; cf. 
ethnologism and social Darwinism in German legal scholarship of the 19th cc 
1 
1 
1 
also von Stephanitz, Exakte Wissenschaft und Recht, n. 69, at 135-215. h 1 tS7Zl• 
74 A.H. Post, Einleitung in eine Naturwissenschaft des Rechts (Oldenburg: ~cd u,;~ stufe» 
[r~levant pa?e(s)]; R. von Jhering, CJ_eis: des r~mischen Rechts auf den verschte ;:n: scient.a, 
semer Entwtcklung, 4th/9th edn (Le1pz1g: Brettkopf und Hartel, 1880, repr. Aa 1 cience 11'1 
1968), Part II/2, ~ 41,361: Legal scholarly writing may be described as 'natura sftutiol'lal 
the spiritual sphere'. See also: 'It has here been undertaken the same with cons 
1
·uatiol'l• 
h 
'fi e:xann '1'1 
law as what 1 t rive to achieve with my Roman law - a natural-scientl c 1 1SSZ 1 
1 
1 
1 
a chemical analysis of the object' (R. von Jhering, Letter to Gerber from 17 J~!' Gren1er, 
M.G. Losano (ed.), Der Briefwechsel zwischen Jhering und Gerber (Ebelsbac · 
1984), Part 1, 51 (author's trans.). 
. ng uber 
75 J. E. Kuntze, Der Wendepunkt der Rechtswissenschaft: Ein Beitrag zur Orienfleru ara. S9· 
den gegenwiirtigen Stand- und Zielpunkt derselben (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1856), 90.' 1ogischef 
1 
1 
76 See, most particularly H. Kelsen, ilber Grenzen zwischen juristischer und sozto. ological 
Methocle (Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1911), 16 (Presentation to the Viennese. soc~ith the 
Sodety): 'An example for such an inadmissible mixing of the nonnat!Ve b natural 
explicative considerations, of such a faulty syncretism of methods is presented , y 1 11• ~t 
law.' (author's trans.). See already Holtzendorff, 'Einleitung in das Volkerrecht' 1 • 
44-45. 
. 13th edl'l 
77 D. Anzilotti, Corso di Diritto Internazionale, Introduzione - Teorie General!, 
(Roma: Atheneaum, 1928), 16-18. 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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Issues 78 E 
law b~t ver~hing else was 'not a political theory of public internatio
nal 
A ~ pohhcal ideology'_79 
ll1encan p · 
opposite . r~gmatlsm at the end of the 19th cen
tury ran in the 
It cone . ~rectwn, but with the same goal of scientification. 
relation e~~e of legal science as a discipline for investigating causal 
cloakeds· tps and prognosticating re
sults.80 Legal scholarship was 
lll sci f · h Psychoa 1 . en l~tsm t rough 
recourse to sociology, psychology and 
satisfy thna ysts. In lllternationa11ega1 sc
holarship, legal realism aspired to 
rnatic e e demands of scientification. T
hus, in his renowned program-
Warned s:~y ~f 1940, !fans Morgenthau, who was by training a lawyer, 
scientifi dat lllternatwnal legal scholar
ship was 'in a retarded state of 
tive tre ~ evelopment'.81 Georg Schwarzenberger preached an 'induc-
ev-olved a ment of international law' as 
'an empirically and dialectically 
rationaU respons.e to ... the shortcomin
gs of deductive speculation and 
After ~ unvenfiable eclecticism in the Doctrine of international law'. 
82 
~ 'retreat f; catastr~~h: o~ the Third Reich and the Seco~d World 
War 
tnternar om posthvtsm and a 'retu
rn to natural law took place in 
'inaccep~~~~~ legal scholarship. 83 Thereby the academy reacted to the 
obv-iou . thty of an unfettered auton
omy of states that has become 
sIn the two world wars' and so attempt
ed to found 'international 
7a 
ao R:eJsen, Law or . 
. 
See aiUon th :1 the Untted Nations, n. 36, at
 xiii. 79 Kelsen, 'Preface', n. 13, at IX. 
Efarv LR. !43 e ~rag~atists 0. W. Holmes, 'Law in Science and Science in Law' (
1899) 12 
Spe.eches, Judi r.epr. 1 ~ ~· Posner (ed.), The Essential Holmes: Selecti
ons from the L~tters, 
a1 Universit p Cla/ Opmtons, and 
Other Writings of Oliver Wen dell Holmes, !r (Chicago
 
B:.J. Mo y ress, 1992), 185-200. 
8 ~ 260, 264rgenthau, 'Positivism, Functionalism, and Internationa
l taw' (1940) 34 A/lL 
G . 
. Schwarzenb 
1_965), 4. Sch erger, The Inductive Approach to 
International Law (London: Stevens, 
511Uplific t' ';arzenberger found intern
ational legal scholarship to suffer fro
m 'over-
between~ Ions' and 'doctrinal attempts to blur, rather than clarify, the b
orderlines 
focus on t~: ~ata and le~ ferenda'. In contrast, the proclaimed indu~ti':e meth~d shoul~ 
[accord· (l) exclusive character of three law-
creating processes mmternatwnallaw
 
of rulesmgf !to Art. 38 ICJ Statute) '(2) establishment o
f the "means for the determination 
· 
0 aw" ( h ' · 
· 
· h 
rahonaiJ . t e law-determining 
agencies and their elements) m accordance Wit
 
law as thy Venfiable criteria'; '(3) awareness of t
he character of the rules of internation
al 
Principl e only binding norms of inter
national law'. This proposition implie
d 'that legal 
Other le esl 
011 
any level of abstraction terms of class
ification, maxims or analogies from 
~ 1 lductivga syste~ns as such cannot be '"sources" of rules of international law.' Fi
nally, the 
111terna/ rnethod sought the '4) realisation o
f the differences which exist between
 
n Iona! la 
d fi 11 · d · t 
a3 ational . W as applied in unor
ganised partly organised an u y orgamse
 m er-
t; societ ' ( ' 
· Scheun , Y Ibid., 4-6). 
556, 60? ~r, Naturalistische Striimungen im heutigen Viilkerrecht' (195
0/51) 13 ZaoRV 
Gerllla11y (;uthor' s trans.). According t
o Sche~mer, this 'retreat' was not limited to 
or the A.nglo-Saxon and French spher
e see ibid., 585-89). 
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alSO 
. suewas h 
law independently from the will of states' .81 However, the. 1 ~ throUS 
about salvaging the scientific character of legal wntln;ristotelial:l 
a renewed focus on 'enduring' subject matters85 in the sense.
86 
with high 
By contrast, the New Haven School, which ent~red stag; frolll other 
scientific ambitions, promised a new jurisprudence, mfon:ne alues and 
disciplines and context-related. It focussed on comm0
.
0 
v ument of 
advocated 'the conscious, deliberate use of law as an mstr the yale 
politics.'s7 As Myres McDougal pronounced in an address ~ 0 st ... and 
Law School Association in 1947, 'our aspirations are not rno ebefore to0 
our emphasis is now primarily upon construction ... we hope thods of 
long to become a faculty . . . which can bring the best rn~ taSR of 
contemporary science, and the creative flash of insight, to d t ~ng these 
creating the law of the future' .ss The approach accornrno a~olarshiF· ambitions continues to be significant for international legal se of legal Many fundamental doubts about the 'scientific' char~ct~r cc'. fof 
scholarships9 go back to the Aristotelian notion of scl~ niversal 
Aristotle, science was possible only in relation to necessary an u·valence 
subject matters.90 This arose from his demand for strict e~~~rn tbC 
between knowledge and the subject of knowledge. erience, 
Aristotelian perspective, law belonged to the realm of huma~ e~P wisdoJ11 
which related to transient, perishable things. Pracuca tingent 
(<pp6vt)cn<:;), or prudence (prudentia), which recognises the con 
8
: Ibid., 607. 
f' (l953,repr· 
8
" See e.g. E. Wolf, 'Fragwilrdigkeit und Notwendigkeit der Rechtswissenscha t 
. 
1965) 15 Freiburger Universitiitsreden 20-21. 
heatl Ethl~·~' 
86 For the Aristotelian concept of science see Aristotle, The Nicom~ yl, cbaP· 111' 
H. Rackham (trans.) (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), boo 
sec. 2. 87 
.. ill 
Lasswell and McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free Society, n. 12, at JOUI· l' gciePce l 
88 M. S. McDougal, 'The Law School of the Future: From Legal Realism to Po tCY !VfcDOilga z 
~he Wor:d Community' (1946/47) 56 YLJ 1345, 1355. See also ~·~· (l953·1) 8 
InternatiOnal Law, l'ower, and Policy: A Contemporary Conceptton J'~ 
RCADI 133. 
, 975) 5 Stll \ 
89 See 0. W einberger, 'Der Wissenschaftsbegriff der Rechtswissenschaften ( 1 hafdichttel. 
Leibnitiana, special issue (Sonderheft) 102; A. Kaufmann, 'Ober die Wissens~ 
4z5, 429• 
der Rechtswissenschaft' (1986) 72 Archiv fiir Rechts- und Sozialphiloso?,h.te e!1: rJohf 
C. Engel and W. Schon (eds.), Das Proprium der Rechtswissenschaften ('fubmg 
·Be 
Siebeck, 2007). 
fScie!ltt 
90 
'We all conceive that a thing we know scientifically cannot vary; ... An object? Aristotle, 
Knowledge, therefore, exists of necessity. It is therefore eternal, · · · 
The Nicomachean Ethics, n. 86, at iii. 
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realities of . 
jurispr d practice, was therefore no science (em<tt'~flTJ).
91 Accordingly, 
The u :nee "':as merely a 'wise knowled
ge of law'. 
Jnlius ~nstotehan notion obviously influenced the Prussian Prosecutor 
'Worth! ermann van Kirchmann's fam
ous 1847 Berlin lecture on the 
the tra e~sness of Jurisprudence as a Science'. Kirchmann had id
entified 
from w~~Itoriness of the subject matter of Jaw 'as the fundamenta
l ill, 
becom rch the science suffered'. 'By m
aking the accidental its object, it 
law lib es r.andom itself; three corrective 
words of the legislator, and entire 
Paper rane~ become scrap paper. m The fear of producing only s
crap 
very q e~p~crally haunts international legal scholars in areas which evolv
e 
inalla Ulc y, such as international investmen
t law or international crim-
w. 
The . 5.4.2 The Promise
 of Theory 
histo~ents of the critique of unscholarliness and of the current and 
assesse~ ~ttem~ts to scientify the research in international law can be
 
successful Ya~krng how (and which) types of research better achieve w
hat 
lllulati SCI~nces are generally supposed to achieve, n
amely the accu-
depen;n of mter-subjective knowledge. (Which k
nowledge of course 
Leg Is on research interest and research
 questions asked.) 
Produ a ~cholars acknowledge that their research should, in principle
, 
gains ce new discoveries'. 
93 However, in legal scholarship, knowle
dge 
What ~re ~ot as obvious, and it is even explicitly denied that they exist.
94 
Is t e reason for the Jacking accumula
tion of knowledge in legal 
9! ' 
[I)t follows h 
admit f .t ~t Prudence is not the same as Science, ... becau
se matters of conduct 
dence ~ vanatJon': ibid., vol. VI, iv, 3). According to H.J. Berman, Aris
totle's jurispru-
H.J. Be as not even a TEXVI} rather it ve
rged into ethics, politics, religion, and r
hetoric. 
9 (Can1b ~dlllan, Law and Revolution: The Formation
 of the Westem Legal Tradition 
2 n ge· H d J.I-J. vo ·. arvar University Press, 1983), 13
3. 
B.H. Mn K!rchmann, 'Die Wertlos
igkeit der Jurisprudenz als Wissens
chaft' in 
9 (Heidelbeyer-Tscheppe (eel.
), Die Wert/osigkeit der furisprudenz als Wissensch
aft 
3 erg·M. C.F. Von sa' ' anutlUs, 1988), at 15, 29 (author's
 trans.). 
J. Big . b VJgny, System of the Modern Roman Law, 
W. Hol!oway (transl.), (Madras: 
broug;:n. otham, 1867), ix-x, stressed that
 'the mass of acquirements [Kenntnisse] 
Nothi ll1to ~peration, in comparison with that earlier time, 
stands very high . · · 
discovng. certamty is more commenda
ble than the effort to enrich science 
by fresh 
94 '"' enes· ' 
"-lrch ' ·; · · 
Since :a;ln, Wertlosigkeit der Jurispru
denz', n. 92, at 13: '[L)egal scholar~hip · · · has, 
beco 1 east t
he times of Bacon remained stationar
y ... , the controversies l1ave not 
finallllle ess, but more, even where the 
most laborious full investigation though
t to have 
Y reach i 
I b · ' 
(auth , ec a stable result, barely a decade
 passes and the quarre egms anew 
or s trans.). 
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dtt" 
5 
~~d~~ 
research?9 The reason does not appear to lie in the me 
. the 111 96 
cing knowledge. The core of the scientific procedure 1sthe result .. 
subjectivity of method, that is, of the path that leads t~ applied 1 ~ 
In the 'exact' sciences, that method should be apt to t al scholar 
principle by everyone, and then lead to the same result. In egather tbatl 
ship, results are obtained primarily through argument r but rather 
through empirical observation. There is not one single ans:ver defiued bY 
a range of possible results, the outer limits of that range beln~ es of argu· 
the admissible (that is, professionally acknowledged) strategthiP is high· 
mentation. The standard of argument in good legal sch~la~s epeatable· 
Findings of legal research will generally be inter-subjectwe Y ~ the focus 
The reason for the meagre accumulation of knowledge rather lS tiug linlt 
of legal research on concrete applications of law: The ~ouu;~is is ·~ess 
between theory and less abstract research results 1s lackmg. d brtcltS 
h . 
. funuse 
t e construction of a building ... but the accumulattotl o 
· 
.1 , 97 
be 
m a pt e . 
. s itl t 
T 
. 
. d theone "' 
o construct the edtfice of legal scholarship, we nee 
. hed frow d. ' gutS be 
sense of models. What I have in mind needs to be 1sttn 
.-v' 111 t 
'b' ' d' \1 ' 
\1 d 'theO•I ''ttl 
tgger an sma er concepts which are often also ea e , h orieS 
professional jargon of jurists. I do not mean grand designs, t '~iscourse 
the parlance of social sciences and the humanities, such as re rather 
theory', 'general systems theory', or 'pure theory oflaw' ·Those a bjects of 
paradigms or frameworks, lenses through which the relevant 
0 
ivetl bY 
study are examined. Neither do I mean the singular answers ~ 011 crete 
law-appliers to interpret a legal norm in an actual case, to solve a 0115titl.1' 
legal question. Examples would be the declaratory against the c. ust the 
tive 'theory' of recognition of states, the constitutional agal Vie11tla 
internationalist 'theory' with regard to Art. 46 of the relatiVe 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, the absolute against the 
'theory' of reservations to multilateral treaties, and so on. 
00r the 
In contrast, in science, theories are neither the big paradig1lls, . es are 
concrete reading of one specific legal institution. Here, theorl 
·th that 
95 
. f t th (and wl l g(>l 
One reason could be that legal scholarship actually does not stnve or ru. 
. 115 of e 
for knowledge). This view, however, does not do justice to the asplratto 
research. 
. as Galileo 
96 Accordingly, the central feature of science is neither the tlse of mathematics, ested· see 
Galilei thought, nor the inductive procedure, as Francis Bacon s:lggbei Gt~stall 
H. Schwenke, Zuriick zur Wirklichkeit: Bewusstsein und Erkenntrus 
Teichmiiller (Basel: Schwabe, 2006), 293-97. 
t!1Parative 
97 J. Binder, Philosophic des Rechts (Berlin: Stilke, 1925), 948, referring here to eo 
law (author's trans.). 
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normally con . d 
requirem cetve of as models or 
structures.
98 The most general 
express t~nt for all scientific theories is as follows: theories shou
ld 
Under ob e pat~erns or structures of data or of phenomena in
 the field 
should ~ervatiOn, as parsimoniously and concisely as possible
. They 
data· core uce complexity. So, 'a usefu
l theory is a compression of the 
' mpreh · · better y ens10n IS compression 
. . . The simpler the theory, the 
relate 11.kou understand s
omething.'99 Importantly, theories mu
st inter-
e sto · h This c nes m a ouse or pieces of a
 puzzle. 
law, ther~:~ep~ of theory is applicable to legal scholarship. In internationa
l 
such a 'd e mdeed theories that do re
duce complexity. An example of 
subsidia . ata-condensing' theory is th
at of subsidiarity. The idea of 
rellled1. nty forms 
the common basis of different rules (e.g. the 
local 
es rule th · . 
Operatio ' e pnonty of regional org
anisations over UN peacekeeping 
to dom ~~, and the complementarity of the International Criminal C
ourt 
17 of t~s ~c courts in the prosecution of international crimes under Article 
scholars e CC Statute).
100 On the basis of this reduction of comp
lexity, 
colllmu ~an show that the subsidiary responsibility of the intern
ational 
in its dull!ty for guaranteeing human secu
rity when the territorial state fails 
legal thety ~ 0 Protect 'fits' into the international legal system. International 
thus su ones in that sense generate in
ter-subjective knowledge and are 
ccessfu] scholarship.101 
5.4.3 T:'h e Promise of Foundational (as Opposed to Applied) 
'rh International Legal Scholars
hip 
'c e Producti f h . . 
. 
. 
tOund t' on o t eones m the sense 
explamed above mtght be called 
b a Iona}'· etwee , International legal research. Concede
dly, the usual dichotomy 
of Iegat applied' and 'foundational' scie
nce is not so relevant in the field 
scholarship which always - however in
directly - relates to actual 
9R 
A.P. Chalm 
. 
. . 
99 Press, 199 ers, WhcJt Is 
This Thing Called Science?, 3rd edn (Berkshire: O
pen Umversity 
See G. C 
9 ~· . 1 0~-48 ('Theories as Structures II and II'). 
therei , haam, The Limits of Reaso
n' (2006) 294 SA 74-81 and the literature cite
d 
one, t~· Conversely, if the only law that describes some data is an extremely co
mplicated 
explai en the data are actually lawless
.' So 'a theory has to be simpler than t
he data it 
Leibni~~·,~h~rwise it does not explain anything' (ibid.). Chaitin draws support he
re from 
irregufj · , ais quand une regie est fort composee,
 ~a qui luy est conforme, passe ~our 
100 1985), 1 ~' G.W. ,Leibniz, Discours de Metaphysique, 2nd edn (Hamburg: F
. Memer, 
Cf. p C (authors emphasis). 
· aroz ' 
· 
' ( ) 97 
101 .!l.J[L 38 za, Subsidiarity as a Stru
ctural Principle of Human Rights Law
 2003 
s . 
ee on th , 
e theoretical' research dimension also 
Section 5.6.3.2. 
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, of . . a1 funcH011 
problems of society simply because this is a pnnclp hiP generate~ 
the law. Ideal-typically, 'applied' international legal schola~ directlY 1.1se d 
knowledge at a low level of abstraction, knowledge that can et·on-oriente A plica 1 irt 
to solve concrete legal and hence societal problems. P ete belp 
studies advise institutions and office-holders, providing .con~r greewen~· 
decision-making or prompting the preparation of internatlona ~ practice lS 
The line between this type of research and international lega 
\.lt I 
blurred. 
1 dge ab0 
'Foundational' scholarship, in contrast, furnishes kn~W e 1 \aVI'· Art 1 
basic structures, developments or patterns of internatt?nal VI'· 
example would be the scholarly lens of global administrauve ~ onallegal 
This type of research can withstand the dynamics of interna~~rs 
sbotM 
development, notably in some fields. International legal scho lit)'· onlY 
react by working on a sufficient level of abstraction and gene~a ges, and 
then will their work be independent of the latest technical c an aper· 
refer to a lasting object of study, and will not to produce scrar ~ineSS of 
To conclude, academics can meet the charge of unsch? ar.11 (wore 
international legal work by building theories and by engag 1 n~ 1 tive and 
or less) foundational research. The turn to empirics (quahta variol.15 
quantitative) is fertile but might be put into perspective ~n al legal 
grounds: First, the attempt at scientification of internatlO(rangiOS 
research through reliance on different neighbouring disciplines 110wics) 
from mechanics over biology, social sciences, linguistics, to eco that the, 
has been a recurring feature of the discipline which sh0;'5 d' dataS 
ongoing empirical turn is nothing totally new. Second, the ha~ bY legal 
and figures' exactitude and objectivity should not be overrate loitatiotl 
scholars, nor their vulnerability to ideological interpretation, exP inclina' 
or even manipulation neglected. And finally, the contempora~ 
c\l.ldi11S 
tion to consider (explicitly or implicitly) the exact sciences (ln wodel 
economics) as the prime type of true research, and hence als.o as a 
for international legal research, should be viewed with cautl0l1· 
5.5 Charge No. 4 5.5.1 The Problem or Practical Irrelevance 
. 5 
'} 
d wl' , 
Scholars of international law, are, just like other professional aca f e50cial 
called upon to demonstrate that their work has some sort 0 ucratiC 
significance or practical utility.102 This normal political or burea 
102 Orford, 'Scientific Reason', n. 34, at 381. 
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demand i 1 . . 
Ihuch . s a so. VOiced wrth regard to legal sc
holarship. The reproach that 
irrei InternatiOnal scholarship risks to be 
(in practical or social terms) 
evant eo t't . 
. 
lllor , ns I utes m many ways the opp
osite of charge no. 3. And the 
mo e sc;olarly' (theoretical and foundational) the sch
olars' work is, the 
I recvu nerable it is to the charge of irrelevan
ce. 
n tact mu h f' . 
away fi ' c o mternahonalJegaJ scholarshi
p appears to have drifted 
cially rom legal, notably judicia], practice. US-Academi
c writing espe-
irrel appears to be so theoretical, so much
 'Jaw and ... ' that it seems 
citedev~nt and uninteresting for legal practice and is in consequence not 
'estr Y the courts. An observer has ch
aracterised the situation as 
Pro~an~ement', as 'disconnection', and 'gap between academy and 
essron' 103 A .11 . 1 
, ( . . ') 
is g· · n 1 ustratron of the profess
iona s practitioners stance 
rven b J h Stat fi Y 0 n B. Bellinger III, legal adviser to the 
US Department of 
law: rom 2005 to 2009. He encouraged the s
tudent-run US international 
not ~~rnals 'to try to stay away from the theoretical, which is generally 
reV:i e pf~ to practicing government lawyers ... I found 90% of law T~; artic]~~ not terribly helpful' because they were 'too academic'. Io
4 
Othe , ~ra~hhoner's complaint does not meet deaf ears, because, on 
the 
an i r srde ' many international legal scholars w
ish their writings to have 
con/iact on the improvement of intern
ational law and thereby to 
a la~ ute to law reform. For example, Antonio Cassese opined: '[F]or 
a br ~r to be not a mere technician, but also somebody who ha
s 
chan °~ er mind, it would also be important to try to contribute to 
Cas gzng the law in addition to interpreting t
he existing law'. 105
 It is, 
sese th h , 
and oug t, the moral duty for lawyer
s to propose reform of rules 
regulation h h' d 
' 106 
s w enever t rs prove necessary . 
5.5.2 The Lack of Academic Law-Making Power 
1,h 
and the Beauty of it 
sat~~cholars' desire to influence the evolution of international law can be 
not a:: only indirectly. The reason is that in
ternational legal scholars are 
should not be law-makers, although Article
 38(l)(d) of the ICJ 
103 
1o4 Twining F 
, 
. , 
Ben· ' arnsworth, Vogenauer, and Teson, T
he Role of Academ1cs, n. 59, at 929-33. 
tnger and h" 
d · · · I 
tre t ts colleagues are _ if at all -
intereste 111 overv1ew art!C es, e.g., on som
e 
a y neg t" . 
d . h . " . b r . 
states 0 lat10ns, especially on older tr
eaties, an Wit 1I110rmatwn a out 10re1g
n 
iss · A.t least: 'occasionally we would find
 people who really thought hard about an
 
rrr ~eland Who Would give us something that we hadn't thought of before.' (J. B. Bellinger 
I os • ntervi, ' ( Casses . ew 2010) 52 Harv IL!O 32, 33). 
e, Five masters, n. 49, at 143 (emphasis added). 
106 Ibid., 256. 
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r . ts of 
Statute mentions the 'teachings of the most highly qualifie~ p~b IClSf the the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determmatlO~ 0 the rules of law'. The phrasing of Article 38 (dating from 1922) tnamfes~. gs zeitgeist at the beginning of the 20th century. The referen~e to _'teac : ol of the most highly qualified publicists' is inspired by the htstonca} se 0 d of law and its benevolent attitude towards 'the law of jurists' or learner)' law' and was an heir to the (romantic) reaction against the codific~to is ideal of the enlightenment. The formulation of law by a~ademt~S 9 th typical for young and undeveloped areas of law (such as, m the d in century, the domestic private law in continental European states an d the 21st century the European private law). Any new, rudimentary ~n g largely uncodified area of law needs academic standard-setters. Talkt~·s of Hugo Grotius as the 'father of international law' exactly point~ to t 1 d groundlaying work of academics. With more intense codificat1~ 11 ;~e concretisation of a legal order this contribution must necessanly a into the background. 
. be But the importance of academic writing remains, and t~ts ea~ w. explained by pointing to some special features of internatiOnal ~ e These are notably the law's high dynamism and the lack of legi~l::~~s organs. Therefore, for example, as Johann Caspar Bluntschli wrote,. 1 ro-upon academics to 'pronounce [the law) afresh', 'and through thiS P by nouncement further its recognition and validity' .107 Bluntschli the~ g ascribed an indirectly law-creating function to academics. By spea ~cs and writing about an amorphous practice and opinio iuris, acade~lng per~orm a t~sk of verbalising and ~rde~ing, which is n~eded for grasl~ce. an mternatwnal norm and making 1t operational m the first ~ al Indeed, it seems as if the special difficulties of identifying internauo~ 1 norms make the clarifying role of international legal scholars cruc~~ And because the identification already carries in it a kind of syste , atisation, all international legal scholars are to that extent 'law-makers· 
es· 
107 J. C. Bl~nts~hli, Das moderne Viilkerre~ht der ci~ili~erten Staaten als ~echtsbuch ~:;f. .. tellt (Nordlmgen: Beck, 1878), preface ( Vorwort ), tv-v: 'Die Rechtswlssenschaft 1 gten meines Erachtens nicht bloss die schon in fri.ihern Zeiten zur Geltung ge. a; atne Rechtssatze protokolliren, sondern soU auch die in der Gegenwart wtr s und Rechtsuberzcugung nett aussprechen und durch diese Aussprache ihr Anerkenntlrlg ist. Gcltung verschaffen he/fen. je empfindlicher der Mange\ gesetzgeberischer Org~n: die welche fiir die Fortbildung des V olkerrechts sorgen, um so weniger darf .. 51c der Wissenschaft dies~r A~~gabe en~ziehen. Freilich muss sie sich auch da~or but~n;elbst Zukunft vorzugretfen. Ste darf mcht unreife Ideen als wirkliche Rechtssatze un sieht' dann nicht verki.inden, wenn sie ihre Verwirklichung in der Zukunft klar vorber (emphasis added). 
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As the forme B . . h I . . 
. 
broad r ntls egal adviser Mtchael Woo
d put It, there is 'a 
er and im t fi · Writers por ant unctwn played by the most 
eminent of the 
order t (w~o ~ere frequently also practitioners), to give shape and 
lllore t~ t .e disparate strands that make up international law. Even 
and oft a~ m most areas of law, international law owes its framework 
they are~ mdeed the elucidation of its rules to writers, ... In that sense, 
Still e undamental to the international legal system
.'108 
, academ· t 
'[w]ritin s Ic exts are not law. It is a commonplace
 that these 
of the 1 g ~[~ 9 not a (formal) source of the law, but they may be evidence 
be appl'a; · Scholars are 'supposed to elucidat
e what the rules to 
the 'st Ie h by the Court were, not to create them'.
110 Article 38(l)(d) is 
extrac~rd~ ~~~se from which the rules of heads (a), (b), and (c) can be 
e . 
The clas . I 
Writin . stca explanation for the lack oflaw-maki
ng power of scholarly 
state g Is that academics are not part of the machinery of the sovereign 
'[t]h~ A ve~ 3 ~0 years ago, Thomas Hobbes expressed this fact as follows: 
lllaketh ut onty of writers, without the Authority of
 the Common-wealth, 
natura1J not their opinions Law, be they never so true
 .... For though it be 
1'he ab Y reasonable; yet it is by the Soveraigne Power t
hat it is Law'. 112 
lighted ~ence of the 'doctors" decision-making authority is also high-
lllan i rthe English Admiralty Court tindinginl7
78 that '[a] pedantic 
nobod n I.s closet dictates the law of nations; eve
rybody quotes, and 
and w{ llllnds him. The usage is plainly as arbitrary as it is uncertain; 
to eve 
0 sha~l decide, when doctors disagree? Bynkershoek, as it is natural 
contra7 Wnter or speaker who comes after ano
ther, is delighted to 
B Ict Grotius.'ll3 
owever d d · 
d h b h 
Validit : e ucmg the authority of the speak
ers an t ere y t e 
1. Y of mte · 1 
· · 
1 · 
Ine With rnatiOna norms from state sovereig
nty rs no onger m 
current understanding of the meaning of sovereign
ty, which is 
IOR 
111. Wood' . 
,. 
R.. Wolf ' Teachmgs of the Most Highly Qualified Publicists (Art. 3
8(1) ICJ Statute) m 
Io9 (Oxford~: (ed:), Max 1'/anck Encyclopedia of Public International Law,
 online edn 
l!o Ibid., Para. t;ers,ty Press 2011), para. 3. 
A. Pellet 'A : 
The Stat~t rhcle 38', in A. Zimmermann, c. Tomuschat and K. Oellers-Frahm
 (eds.), 
Il} at 853 e of the International Court of Justice, 2nd edn (Oxford Univ
ersity Press, 2012), 
S, R. , Para. 304. 
Osenne . I 
. I t. I 
11< Court of I u ';1t 1 the assistance of Y. Ronen, The Law and Pr
actice oft ze Interna tan a 
1'. Bobb stlce, 1920-2005, 4th edn, 4 vols. (Leiden: Nijhotf, 2006), vol
. Ill, 1551. 
113 sis adde;)s, Leviathan (London: J.M. Dent & Co/Eve
rymans Library, 1943), 143 (empha-
'fhe '" · 
"'enarcf 9 
' Dec. 1778, 165 ER 51, 222, 224 (emphasis added). 
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I f thority, but 
nowadays considered not to be a self-sufficient source o. au 
rather as instrumental to the realisation of human objecttve~. 
ower 0£ 
The second standard explanation for the lack oflaw-maktng ~ n that 
academic writing does not fare much better. It is the as~ertl~laW·11 4 scholarly texts are not an acknowledged 'source' of internatton~ ystel11 However, the normative closure of the international lega ~elpful through the immanent construction of 'sources' has pro;ed u~t seet11S and is, from the perspective of legal theory, highly dubtous .. 1 norl11• 
more fruitful to determine the quality of 'law' of a given socta but on 
not through recourse to the paradoxical metaphor of the sources, legal 
a case-by-case basis.115 From this perspective, which draws on 116 
pluralism, law-making by social actors is not categorically a no-go. 
In consequence, a modern 'learned law' is conceivable. . aldng 
A different line of reasoning that leaves space for academtc la':-m f the 
is espoused by Critical Legal Studies that mix up the observatzon ~ional law and its creation. When Martti Koskenniemi declares '(I)nterna and law is an argumentative practice',117 he does not say who. argu;~nter­whose arguments count as juris-generative. An understandt~g 0 
rse of 
national law as an argumentative practice implies that the. dtscou tional 
academics is international law and not just talking about t~ter~a bath· 
law. However, this approach risks throwing the baby out wtth t e 
water. The academic discourse does not as such make law. f t that 
What gives some texts status as 'international law' is not the ;c d as 
these have been edicted by a sovereign nor that they are de n~ for a 'source'. It is the dual fact that some norms are socially necessa. ipa· global regulation and that they have been elaborated with the partlC as tion of affected persons. If we take this as a yardstick, schol.ar~ to individuals or as an epistemic community,118 are not authonse king make law. Their expertise is not a sufficient basis of authority for rna ean international law. Referring to an experts' 'code', the then EuroP 
·1 ttber, 
114 G 
, 
' 
. ll ' B,!l gr 
In erman not a Rechtsquelle but a mere 'Rechtserkenntmsque e · 
'Volkerrechtstheorie?', n. 50, at 113, 115. ~~: T. Vesting, Rechtst~cor~e (Miin~hen: Beck, 2007),.78-95. 
e ACtors as 
Cf. A. Peters, L. Kochhn, T. Forster and G. F. Zmkernagel (eds.), Non-stat 
Standard Setters (Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
plarlck 
117 M. Koskenniemi, 'Methodology oflnternational Law' in R. Wolfrunt (ett), Ma.X: zol1)• 
Encyclopedia of Public Intemational Law, online edn (Oxford University press, 
I 
I 
para. 1. 
M }:1aas, 
118 According to P.M. Haas, EpComs are 'networks of knowledge-based experts'~· 
''(199Z) 
'Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Co-ordinatton 
46 ro 1, 2. 
I 
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Court of p· 
relating t r~st Ins.t~nce formulated the following 'grounds of princip
le 
Commis ~ t ,e pohttcal responsibilities and democratic legitimacy of the 
authorit 
81?n' and stated: 'Whilst the Commission
's exercise of public 
(Lisbon{ Is ren~ered legitimate, pursuant to [Article 17(1) of the TEU 
contra] t~x-Article 211 EC], by the European Parliament's political 
Nutriti~ e members of SCAN [Scientific Committee for 
Animal 
cratic le ~1: although they have scientific legitimacy, have neither demo-
a Suffici;rtr~a~y nor political responsibilities. Scientific legitimacy is not 
Altho nt asrs for the exercise of public au
thority'. 119 
further f:ugh expertise may be one source
 of legitimacy and authority, 
nalhely .act~rs must add to it so as to warrant an authority to make law,
 
cipa11•011
1
nstrtutiona1 and procedural ones such as r
epresentativity, parti-
and bl' · 
they do pu Icity. International legal
 scholars are not elected and 
regulate 1 ~ 0 ~ represent stakehoiders. Because they do not attempt to 
coznlhu .. err own affairs (in the style of indigeno
us people, religious 
able to t~~es, or globally active merchants), their texts are not compar-
T 0 c n Irgenous and religious la
w and the lex mercatoria. 
tionaiis~~c ude, international legal scholars, even when acting in institu-
Internar groups such as the Institut de 
droit international or the 
tional 1 
10 ~al Law Association, cannot and should not 'make' interna-
can acqa~ In the same sense as governments. Academic 'codifications' 
· 
urre th t 
rnter-g e s atus oflaw only through 
adoption by a governmental or 
a form 
0 ~:rnmental actor. An example is the Lieber Code, which became 
a lhinisat 
1
.nstruction to the US Army only after its
 incorporation into 
enal o d · 
120 
Agai h r er Issued by the American s
ecretary of war. 
acade.,_,~' t e reason for the need for such an endorsement is not that 
·••Ics are 
. 
h h 
are not d not part of the sovereign sta
te machmery or t at t e texts 
Which th efined as a 'source', but that the i
nstitutions and procedures in 
legitilhi . ey make codes, resolutions and 
memoranda largely lack the 
accot 1 ntb~~ factors of representativity, participation, publicity and 
t · a rhty I 
· f h 1 · · t' 
llhonaJ · n consequence, the authon
ty o se o ars rs not an ms r-
And ~frocedural, or social one, but purely an episternic one. 
changed . Is state of affairs, to make an 
important point, cannot be 
If scholarship is not to lose its essence. 
Scholars are not and 
119 
1~o ~~seT -13!99 
L,eber C , 'Pfizer Animal Health v. Council of the EU 
[2002] ECR If-3305, para. 20!. 
Field, 24 ~de: Instructions for the Government of Armies of the U
nited States in the 
endorsed Pril1863. The norms were over
hauled by a group of army officers and the
n 
(Gener 1 by the then Secretary of 
War, Ed Townsend, Assistant Adjutant General 
.asp. (Ia:t ~~ders No. lOO), available at: http://avalon.Iaw.yale.edu/19th_century/liebe
r 
ecked 12 December 2016). 
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has . 1 tities sue 
should not be accountable to real clients, but only to tdea en. . deational 
the scientific community, the truth, the public, with thts h~ lacking accountability being in no way formalised. It is exact~y lt 1 ~ of law· accountability which is the counterpart to the scholar s . a~. g freelY making power. And this, in turn, is a precondition for thin htn e direct and out of the box. Only because academic treatises do not ~void of legal consequences (as 'law'), and only because scholars are ebroader formal and institutional responsibility (which does not exclude a elves to 'responsibility' towards society at large), can they devote ~heU:leas and thought experiments and speculation, and thereby 'provt~~ 1 d legal float proposals which could act as "midwives" for socta an change' .121 
5.5.3 Mutual Support and Mutual Irritation 
h' can be put 
!he charge o.r irrelevance of international legal scholars ~~ feedback 
mto perspectlVe by acknowledging that there may be a posttlVC also be 
loop between practical and scholarly activity, but that there maY 
of Practice and Scholarship 
a mutually destructive relationship between both. 
not be 
For most international lawyers, it is 'obvious to say that on.e c~~aw'. 12 J. a good lawyer without having, at some point or other, practtse bl one's The reason is, first, that international legal practice (and nota X one's own practice) in fact provides themes for academic writing. Sec~n 'a11aw own practical experience helps one to realise where internauon laW to empirically really stands. For example, a teacher who explains t~e w as it his stu~ents can .check whether his or her assertions reflect th~l~ before stands tf he constders whether these explanations would also h the ICJ. 
. Lord 
Third, practice allows one to test one's (academic) theones. 
McNair, when he was president of the ICJ, said: If I . 
f l and as 
may gwe my own testimony both as a teacher o aw ' 
· _ 
a practitioner, l can say that I have constantly had the following e:J{perlk 
ence. Whereas I may have thought as a teacher or as the author of a bloo 
· l h 
' 
1 le of aVl' 
or an art1c e, t at I had adequately examined some particu ar ru e 
I have constantly found that when I have been confronted with the sa:U g 
rule oflaw in the course of ~riting a professional opinion or contributlll ~~~ A. Cassese, Realizing Utopia (Oxford University Press, 2012), 683. - Cassese, Five Masters, n. 49, at 260. 
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toajudgme t Ih 
may n ' ave been struck by the diffe
rent appearance that the rule 
assume when it i b · pracr s emg examined for th
e purpose of its application in 
the Ic.e to a set of ascertained facts. As stated
 in the textbook it may sound 
quintessence of · d b 
necess . . Wis om, ut when yo
u come to apply it its many 
fW]he aryquabficatiOns or modifications are apt to a
rise in your mind .... 
oflaw n counsel and judge are confronted with the need o
f applying a rule 
is prob 
0 ~ 1 an alleged rule of law, to certain facts established by evidence, it 
useful a de that the legal element in the resu
lting solution will be a more 
writ ~n more practical rule oflaw than a rule elaborated by a teacher or 
er m his stud ki 123 O Y wor ng alone and in the abstrac
t. 
149 
Vera]l, legal p . 
scholarsh. racttce provides the 'reality ch
eck' for international legal 
s lp. 
£ o While int . 1 
or the 8 h ernatiOn
a legal practice is obviously useful and impor
tant 
help intec ol~r, the reverse is equally true: international scholarship can 
has even ~natiOnal legal practice. In continental Europe, legal scholarship 
consists . een called 'a theory for reflecting pra
ctice', the essence of which 
is in ape In J?at practical relevance.
124 Seen in this light, legal scholarship 
lians-~u lar way an 'applied' as opposed to a 'foundationa1 science'. 
125 
foru111 of eorg Gadamer wro
te that 'theory must justify itself before the 
aPractic ractice'·
126 In other words, 'theory' is valuable (only) if it has 
one for a use. I submit that the explanatory p
ower of a theory is already 
theory.~~ ~f practical use: there is nothing more practical than a good 
uch a theory, once established, may be applie
d only at a later 
1~3 
A.DL M 
the La~ ccNair, 'The Development of International Justice; Two Lectures Delivered in 
(eds.), Lor~ntre of~ew York University' (1954) in Sir G. Fitzmaurice and R.Y. 
Jennings 
1~ 4 257-58. McNazr: Selected Papers and Bibliography (Leiden: Sijthotf, 1974), at
 242, 
~· ~On Arnauld 'D' w· I h . 0"" ff d' Ozlahvis ' . Ie 1ssenschaft vom iiffentlichen Rec 1t nac em er unung tr IC 
und Wis;;nschaftliche Theorie' in A. Funke and J. LUdema
nn ( eds.), 6Jfentliches Recht 
B. Schui ns.chaftstheorie (Tiibingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), at 
65, 75 with note 52; 
ak ze. Ftelitz 'S 
· · 
h · b 
ademisch ' taatsrechtslehre als Wissensc
haft: Dimenswnen emer nurse em ar 
l~s Wissenschaftn F~agestellung' in H. Schulze-Fielitz (ed.), Sta
atsrechtslehre als 
1~6 See on 'fo d(Berhn: Duncker & Hum blot, 2007), at 11, 26. 
f! un atio I' I I 
··G. Gad na se 10 arship Section 5.4.3. 
1~7 liUJsiitz (Famer, 'Lob der Theorie' in H.-G. Gadamer, Lob der 
Theorie: Reden zmd 
A. e Tankfl 
) 
· Peters, 'T ur.t: Suhrkamp, 1983), 26, at 38 (author's t
rans. . . 
Contem here IS Nothing More Practical 
than a Good Theory: An Ovemew of 
o' Porary A 
, GYIL 2 Th' d' t . 
'ten a 'b pproaches to International Law (200
1) 44 r 5. 1s Ic urn IS 
!·I<ant ~~~~ ed to hnmanuel Kant but was probably coined by Ludwig Boltzmann. 
1 ' vber d G 
· h · · b · 1 t 
n der p . , en emeinspruch: Das mag in d
er Theorie ne tig sem, taugt a er me 1 s 
(Berlin: ;~~Is in W. Weischedel (ed.), Jmmanuel Kant: Werke in 12. Biinden, 12. vols
. 
Pr3.l(is itn ~~amp, 1977), vol. XI, 127-72, esp. Ch. Ill, 'Vom_Yerhiil~ms der The~~1e zu
r 
Absicht b olkerrecht, in allgemein-philantr
opischer Abs1cht, d.1. kosmopohtlscher 
etrachtet'. The phrase was first clearly expres
sed (without reference to Kant) 
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'fit' about the 1 
stage, when the circumstances arrive. For example, a th~ory ationallega 
of a right to humanitarian assistance into the current tntern 1'his 111eans 
system may be needed when a huge natural disaster occurs. ay acquire 
that a good theory may not deploy any immediate effe~t but ~untanities, practical relevance in the long term. Also, particularly 1 ~ the 1 useful bY 
and in legal scholarship, theories may be (very) indtrec~ Y ossibilitie~, 
allowing us to think up new realities, to develop our sense 0 ~ dging th15 
our Moglichkeitssinn to speak with Robert Musil.128 AcknOW e ense tbat1 
type of usefulness makes scholarship 'relevant' in a broad~r. s er quoted 
the one often meant by practitioners such as the legal a vts 
above. 
. alleviate 
Finally, merely 'indirect' practical uses of scholarshtp ~ayltaneous) the potential damage brought to scholarship through a ,< 51 ~~ atio11 tO 
practical activity of the scholar. First, the practitioner 5 0 1g towards 
reach specific results is incompatible with the scholar's open~::; 1111 part~­
any results. Second, the loss of distance endangers the (relatt hOlarsbtP 
ality, and thus scholar's ability to critique. An enmeshment of 5 ~ n of the 
with practice would undermine one broader societal func~~ function 
group of scholars, seen as an epistemic community, namely t 
of intellectual critique and check of legal practice. 129 barge of 
These considerations may to a large extent alleviate thed c _ 011 the 
practical 'irrelevance' of international legal scholarship, an , 
contrary - underscore the benefits of that seeming 'irrelevance · 
5.6 Charge No. 5 5.6.1 Implicit and Explicit Critique of Doctrinalistrl 
1 gal . nal e 
The critique of doctrinalism directed at much of internat~o the fact 
scholarship is seldom voiced explicitly. But it shows itself ~n vs la~ 
that doctrinal papers are hardly accepted for publication tn 
popurare 
b L B l ·-~·, 
. 
' . B ltz!llann, "' das 
Y · o tzmann, uber d1e Bedeutung von Theorien (1890), m L. 0 
·e auCl' 
Schriften,. Engelbert Broda (ed.) (1979), 5458 at 57: 'DaE ... die Theon 
denkbar praktischste, gewissermaEen die Quintessenz der Praxis sei' · d 
12R A B d d d 1 · 
· · 
· 
S atl 
. von og an y ma e t 11s pomt m the research semmar. 
t'!tionet s 
129 S th 
. f 
. . 
. 
l f prac ~ au 
ee on e necesstty o a cnttcal d1stance (and generally on the ro es 0 kt'kertl 47 
scholars in international law) A. Peters, 'Rollen von Rechtsdenkern und pra·r:errecht 
vo\kerrechtlicher Sicht' in Berichte der deutschen Gesellschajt fiir V? 11ce tfroO~ 
(Heidelberg: CF Muller, 2012), 105-137, at 144-53; on the 'reflexive dtst~ nal Leg 
· 1 
· d f 
'1 ternatlO 
practlce reqmre or international legal research' Bernstorti, n 
Scholarship', n. 31 ), at 979, 984. 
i I 
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ev-Iews xr 
P . · •'~OWadays th 
. 
. 
ercenred fl ' e most popu
lar suggestiOn for remedymg 
the 
Work to b aw of doctrinalism is qu
alitative and quantitative empi
rical 
need to b: ~er~orm~d by international legal scholars (who conseq
uently 
'I'his Presc . r~med m interview techniques and/or statistical
 analysis). 
to abstain ~IPtio? normally goes hand-in-hand with the recomm
endation 
analysis rdom normative' sch
olarship and to concentrate on
 'positive' 
h 'an to th 
c arge of 'd at extent sim
ultaneously reacts to charge n
o. 2 (the 
0 I eology). that~: ;~y ~f :xpressing the critique of doctrinalism is the observation 
Of activityltSCiphnary' limitations o
f doctrinal scholarship makes th
at type 
a oo 'leg I' . 1 
. . h d 
rgull1ents £ a m t 1e sense tha
t fails to absorb methods, ms1g 
ts an 
~hat an int rom. other disciplines. For example, Isabel Feichtner
 remarks 
1
ngs, but ernatronallawyer sho
uld not only 'disclose ideologic
al lean-
Other d1· · ·: go a step further and
 support her preferences by refe
rence to 
th 
8C!Plin b 
· 
· 
eory'.IJo Sh .es .e they mor
al philosophy, economics or so
cial 
abov-e _ . d' e Identifies a dilem
ma: she holds it- for the reaso
ns stated 
d' · 111 lSp bJ 18Ciplines to , ensa e to absorb in
sights and arguments from o
ther 
Words, int d' ~roaden the base for principled contestation
'. In other 
~Ork, Bute~ lSczplinarity is necessary to maintain the quality o
f scholarly 
Integratio' n the other hand, it 
is exactly this interdisciplinarity
 (and the 
~ur Wriu 11 ~f ot~er legal disciplines, such as private or criminal 
law into 
110l1al) Ia~gs Which 'might dampen our idealism as concerns (inter
na-
:rue schoi as an instrument to r
ealize Utopia'. Lawyers, if they 
want to be 
lnevitabJ ars, can therefore not
 be idealists. This leads Feichtner
 to the 
'~lld e concJu . ' 
. . t 
find sron: If as interna
tional lawyers we want to parttctp
a e 
to d consolat· · 
. 
· 11 d 
o th · Ion In the utopian pro
ject of mternatwna aw we nee 
co11 
15 
not as h 1 . . 
' 131 A h' · 1t her 
cern I' se o ars but as pra
ctitiOners. t t IS pou ' 
a tgns 't 1 1 
se f with charge no. 4 (unscholarliness
). 
In 0 d S.6.2 The Lim
its of Doctrinal Scholarship 
r er t ci~rify Wh~t assess the merits of the charge of d~ctrinalism, '_Ve nee
d t.o 
~lght be w~ mean by 'doctrinal scholarship , and examm
e why It 
. 
0
ctrina} Particularly problematic with
 regard to international law. 
VIew of th s~holarship maps international law. First, it conveys 
an ~ver­
'~nd rule e aw as it stands by arranging legal concepts, basic
 principles, 
stru s on d · · 
(' · ') nd 
ctures th ecrston making. Se
condly, it orders syst~mattses a . 
'-'o e law. This researc
h dimension is called doctnnal
 because tt 
FeicJ ltner 'R 
' ealizing Utopia', n. 30, at 1
15. 131 Ibid. at 1157. 
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. 
. . 
t as 'doctrines. 1 
is tied to legal rules, prmc1ples, and declSlons that cou~ 
. arily 1og1c<l. f 
even as 'dogmata'. The method of doctrinal research ~s P~: meaning 01 
semantic analysis. A scholar can, for example, e~am 1 ~e f funda111e~ta 
the term 'jurisdiction' in Article 1 ECHR, ':htc~ ts 0 le:>e situat10115 
importance for the applicability of the Convention 1 ~ cot11P 1 sis seek~ to 
such as peace missions abroad. Importantly, doctnna~ analr is pracuce-
impact directly on court decisions and on treaty-ma~tng. 
1 shiP of la1N 
oriented to such an extent that it has been called a scho ~~33 charges 
application'132 and a 'scholarship to prepare decisions · ly charges 
against a scholar's doctrinalism are therefore simultaneous 
against that scholar's practice-orientation. 
fonal la1N• 
I submit that, because of specific qualities of intern~ 1 f lit11ited 
doctrinal analysis in this field is not useless, but indee . 
0 
the t11ait1 
value. First, the stuff of international law is less dense than 1n tort, a11d 
field of application for doctrinal research: domestic contra.ctls,decisiot1S· d · d'cta 
property law. There are, in total, fewer rules an JU 1 ieldS leS~· 
So a logical-semantic analysis of this 'thin' legal subject ma~ter \ 1 uncod1' 
Secondly, a considerable amount of international law lS stl t first be 
fied. The exact content of customary international l~W ~·~ rent task. 
investigated with non-logical-semantic methods. This 15 a 1 \e (treatY 
from the investigation of the meaning or sense of a written ~u ree tbat1 
interpretation).131 Thirdly, international law is to a higher e:asoflless 
domestic law the result of political compromise, and for that r 
systematic and less clear than other legal materials. 
. llaW indee~ 
To conclude, these three special features of internattorta flaW·lt 15 
limit the value of doctrinal research specifically in that area 0 
·deS the . best 
due t? these features that additional research dimensto~s, \laW tba11• 
doctnnal analysis of the law, are more needed in internatlona 
let us say, in the law of civil procedure of a given country. 
bts"'iS' 
13' 'R l 
k. na\e Rec si>JS 
- ec ltsanwendungswissenschaft', see A. van Aaken, 'Fun 110 d o. Vl' 
senschaftstheorie fur die gesamte Rechtswissenschaft' in M. Jestaedt all !Jl 
(eds.), Rechtswissenschaftstheorie (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), at 79
· chaft "
0 
133 •n 
'· 'd b 
. 
d 'Wissens 
c.ntscne1 ungsvor erettungswissenschaft', see V on Arnaul , 
1 
offentlichen Recht', n. 124, at 87. 
tional teSao 
n4 F T , 
. 1 
'fy ·nterna 
.11a t 
'. eson mam Y refers to this feature: 'it is not possible to identl 1 
• iS gol t> al 
rules by conventional doctrinal methods. If international legal scholarshtP\e!Pellt leg·)\ 
l \ 
· t suPP 
't '~ 1 
acvance 1uman values and not simply serve those in power, tt mus wise, 1 a 
1 t · . 1 . . 
h other aP 
c oc :me wtt 1 mternattonal relations theory and political philosop Y • enauer, 
contmu,e to be an exercise in futility.' (Tes6n in Twining, Farnsworth, Vog 
Tes6n, The Role of Academics', n. 59, at 941-47, quotation at 947). 
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5.6.3 Th P . 
l . e romzse of Scholarship in Other Research 
Dimensions 
t Is therefor 
will be ( e suggested that the activity of in
ternational legal scholars 
can bet more? successful, that is, wil
l generate more knowledge which 
in one ransmitted in an inter-subjective way, wh
en it is (also) conducted 
or several other dimensions, beyond 
purely doctrinal analysis. 
On 5.6.3.1 Empirica
l Dimension 
e Possible dime · · · · 1 h 
· 
· 11 1 
scho!arsh. nswn 1s empmca 
researc . Here mternatwna ega 
law is f, Ip attempts to 'study the con
ditions under which international 
E ?~Illed and has effects'. 135 
Illpinca! · 
lUicro 0 ll1ternatio
nal legal scholarship may be condu
cted at the 
Origins rfmacro .level. At the micro le
vel, the researcher investigates the 
traject ~ a particular norm. At the macro level, she or he studies larger 
h ones e
 g th 1 . . 
t e sea ' · · e evo utwn of whole lega
l regimes, such as the Jaw of 
investig 
0 ~ the climate change regime. In either case, the concern is the 
the iden~~~on ?f concrete factors behind the development of norms and 
Emp· .I cation of the conditions und
er which the rules work. 
investi Inca! scholarship can also be
 historical. For example, we can 
Law C gate the historical evolution o
f Article 42 of the International 
~bout t~~Ihission's Articles on State Responsibility to test a hypothesis 
Into fo ed e;eiopment of the concept 
of obligations erga omnes (research 
liabilit;( ah?ns) or to apply that provision co
rrectly in an actual case of 
Em . ~Pphed research). (inter~~r~cal research is notably concerned with the effects or impact of 
a l1lod honal) law. In this research dimen
sion, norms are seen as 
· 
e of 
h · 
Invesr governance, and com
pliance with t ese norms Is 
and t~ga~d. This type of research attempts to establish when, where 
releva w at extent these norms ac
tually direct the behaviour of the 
tionai7t a~tors, and asks why and under what circumstances interna-
intern a :V Is followed or disobeyed. Given the difficultie
s with enforcing 
does n~honaliaw, this dimension is particularly important. However, it 
new g t Work Without a glance outsi
de the discipline. It can profit from 
thing ~Ver?ance theories and administrative theory. More than any-
tionai e sle, ~t should embrace the results of parallel research in interna-
C re ahons. 
sinc~~lpliance research is empirical research, but it is also theory-based, 
Works on models. Gregory Shatfer and
 Tom Ginsburg have called 
l3s 
ShatTer and G. 
msburg, 'The Empirical Turn', n. 63, at I. 
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n et11PlflC 
this' emergent analytics', that is 'analytics that oscillate betwee mple, Jad< 
. b k 
. , 136 For exa d ·ng 
finding, real-world testmg, and ac agam · . 
1 for stl.l ~ 
.Goldsmith and Eric Posner employ a rational cho1Ce m~de functionti\1 
internationallaw,137 with legal norms backed by sanctlon~e scardt1 ° 
much like prices for certain behaviour. For these a~thors, ~ isive factor 
'hard' sanctions for breaches of international law IS the T~ re is, how· 
behind deficiencies in the operation of international law. e ell in such 
ever, much to be gained by working with other models as.w mind that 
'real-world' legal research. 138 Finally, it should be borne ~n thet11seh'es 
empirical approaches, too, may be ideologised, and do not 1n 
guarantee 'objective' or 'scientific' results. 
5.6.3.2 Theoretical Dimension 
ceptual 
. 1 or con be 
Another dimension of research would be the theorettca t39 In t 
one. A~ explai~ed above, the term 'theory' is extremely bluri·stateJl'lent 
precedmg sectwn, I used the term for a middle groun concrete 
between grand design on the one hand, and legal answer to: e is that 
question of interpretation on the other hand. What matters e\de (not 
the theoretical or conceptual research generates findings outs t law', as 
· 'd ) h 
' h 
· es aboU. 't\1 
ms1 e t e concrete legal rules at hand, it produces t eon cot11Pletl ·~ · 
the New Haven School called it,110 and thus reduces 
·what 15 
The theoretician of law is concerned with questions such as. nal lavl 
· t 
· 1 1 ' 
· · ternat10 a: 
m ernatwna aw? and 'How does argument m m f ·nter!l 
function'? Gender-focussed investigations of the structure. 0 1 sion as 
tional law and its potential gender bias fall within this du_ne~ diil'lew 
wel1.141 Good research questions can be asked in the theoretlcla ecent11 
· F 
h on yr e 
81011
• or example, the emergence of customary norms as 142 :sefor ' 
been explained convincingly, in a rational-choice paradigtn· 136 Ib'd 137 • 
52. d Jie 
138 
1 
• Goldsmtth and Posner, The Limits of International Law, .n. Tatsache url 
H. Albert, Rechtswissenschaft als Realwissenschaft: Das Recht als sozwle 
139 Aufgabe der Jurisprudenz (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993), 7, passim. y~: 
· See Section 5.4.2. 
tional V .11 
140 MS M D 1 I 
b t Interna l rshlr 
· · c ouga • 1.D. Lasswel\, and W.M. Reisman, 'Theories a ou tlt Scho a 
Pro~ogue to a Configurative Jurisprudence' (1976-1968) 8 VJIL (Fact y 
. ;st 
141 Senes, Paper 2577) 188, 200, emphasis added. 
. aw: A fenttrl 
H. Charlesworth and C. Chinkin The Boundaries of Internat!Orlal L Cf 
Analysis (Manchester University Press 2000). 
. custoll1a )e 
142 P H Ve d' • E 
' 
Ch nge tn !11P 
.- · . r ter anc, · Voeten, 'Precedent, Compliance, and a 'fhiS eta ess 
International Law: ~n Explanatory Theory' (2014) 108 AJlL 389, 401-_ll· its usef~I1 !'la\ 
shows that no parad1gm can be reasonably employed to explain everyth~ng~ the ratiO 
dep~nds on t.he research question asked. With regard to other quesuon ' 
choice paradtgm may be too reductionist. 
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the trans. t' 
Cttstom 
1 
Ion from breach of the old rule to the e
stablishment of a new 
against~~ r:le had remained mysterious. 143 Or, to give another example, 
culariy . e ackground of denials of int
ernational law144 it seems parti-
nationa{;nportant. to conduct new research into 
the legal-ness of inter-
legitima~.w notwithstanding its weak enforcement and weak democratic
 
In the the . 
Paradig . oretical or conceptual res
earch dimension a plurality of 
Critical~: 1: emer?ing. Until recently, post-modernism, in the form of 
e-ver, crit' gl 
1 Stu.d1es, occupied the space for theory. Pr
esumably, how-
can offe Ica studies will slip into the ba
ckground as (by definition) they 
Play a la; no constructive solutions to p
roblems. Other approaches may 
approachger ~ol~, depending on the area of international law, e.g. feminist
 
rational ~s .m lllternational criminal law and human rights law, o
r 
c Oice theories in treaty law. 
Pinau . 5.6.3.3 Ethical Dime
nsion 
intern~ti ethical-legal research suggests itself, too. In that dimension, 
tionaiia onal legal scholars investigate
 the ethical contents of interna-
With re£w (often embedded in specific world vie
ws) and criticise these 
research ~rence to non-positivist standards of justice.
145 This type of 
in the 8 Is therefore idea
l-typically 'normative' as opposed to 'p
ositive' 
ense e 1 . 
A. rand xp amed previously (Section 5.3.3). 
the Pri .
0
m example of legal-ethical research wo
uld be a reappraisal of 
and de ~aCipl~ of state equality and the tension between de jure equality 
to asses cto Ill equality. It is the job of international l
egal scholars not just 
&ing It ~ whether a general principle of the inequality of states is emer-
. Is als th · 
Well as 't 
0 e1r task to map the structural impact of
 such a change, as 
Iseth' j· 
Anoth Ica Implications. 
'I'his is a er. example are studies on the m
oral foundation of human rights. 
foundar suita~le issue for international legal scholarship since that mo
ral 
tion, an~on Will eo-determine the human rights provisions' interpreta-
113 thus the application and pote
ntial limitations of those rights. 
:~:t~~ the impossibility of distinguishing the error in law (in relation to a still-valid 
111 coutu 1 n~? rule) from the new opinio iuris H. Kelsen, 'Theorie du droit inter
national 
115 J.R_. Bolto r ~ 1939 ) RITD 253-74, 263. 
See e.g. J. ~~ Is There Really "Law" in International Affairs?' .(201?) 10 TLC
P 1. 
cons id , wls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge: Harvar
d Vmvers1ty Press, 1999), 1, who 
of jus/r~ how the content of the Law of Peoples might be developed out of a liber
al idea 
· Ice · See · 1 
' · " 
b d t b 
Intellectual In egal scholarship, e.g.
 A. Cassese: In my vieW, 10r som~ o y o e an 
ethical and not a mere lawyer, is a
lso that he or she attaches great Impo
rtance to 
Values and tries in a way to use them' (Cassese, 
Five Masters, n. 49, at 142). 
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..... , ati 
For example, with the assistance of ethtctsts an 1 t ident1~7 
. 
1 l h l . 1 t be ab e o b·uues 
researchers, international ega se o ars mtg 1 
n capa 1 d 
existing consensus on values having regard to basic huJJ\~y understoO 
and needs.146 These and other problems cannot be proper 
. 
if the ethical research dimension is blended out. 
. unavoidable, 
Why does ethical-legal research seem unavoidable? lt;Sre-refleet o~e 
because there need to be some people to reassess an . to etllbO 1 
particular quality of international law - namely its da~rn enee to P. 0 ~­
and convey justice.147 The evaluation of positive law by re er ropriate ttif 
positivist standards of justice or rightness is even moredapP estie laW~ 
international legal scholarship than in the study of the odrn the laW 
15 t' or er, p.· 
democratic states. The reason is that in a democra lC 
. tional eo. h 
justified by its democratic genesis and by the state's const~~ rn~..tiC w1t 
fines. Considerations of an 'external' legitimacy are pro ~·c procesS· 
regard to laws which have been enacted in a derno~r<l :oundati011' 
In contrast, international law lacks a direct democratle d in state 
Codified bases for international law similar to those {oun nt of the 
constitutions, which would provide criteria for an asses~rne asor~> the 
law's legitimacy, are only rudimentarily available. For th15
. ~e rations to 
study of international law can and must include ethical const e 
. 
a greater degree than research in domestic law. 
. 'ther ine"l' 
Juridico-ethical arguments are often disdained as betng e~) or both· 
~ab~y ideol.o~ic~ (charge no. 2) or unscholarly (charge n~· thleal refleC'f 
fhts scept1c1sm 1s fuelled by the fact that, historically, legal e utllents ~ 
tion was often accompanied by a belief in natural law. M~ a! and 111 
a natural law-type re-emerged briefly after the Second World bt. p,_fte! 
international law is notably associated with Hersch Latlterpae strtteti"e 
this short renaissance, the field was practically cleared of eo~ g poi!lt· 
h . Th 
· 
d turn111 t iti 
et 1cs. e Kosovo mtervention of 1999 represente a. 14s 0 tjttS 
It initiated a 'turn to ethics', as Martti Koskenniemi called lt, n 
the political and legal, but also in academic discourse. 
p.J-· 
146 c• A K s 
h Holland, 19S5);!itY of 
~· 
· · en, Commodities and Capabilities (Amsterdam: Nort Tfle Qt~' 1 at! 
S~~· 'Capability and Well-being' in M. C. Nussbaum and A.K. Sen (eds.)~tl aua fitllrl 
Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 30-50; M.C. Nussbaum, Wot1120oo), 4~l\t 11 e 
Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge University Press, . he ftrst vt ed 
147 J. ~awls, A Theory oflustice (Oxford University Press, 1999), 3: 'Justice tsdt en-arra~g i 
t ·1· · · 
m· tanw ttcel 
o socta mst1tut10ns, ... laws and institutions no matter how e Clen Tltill ]11 5 
must be reformed or abolishet\ if th"" are unJ'ust' See also S. Ratner, The 
·cs 
I . ! 
"/ 
. 
f,thl 
ntemat10na Law (Oxford University Press, 2015). 
.,-. n to 
14R M K k ' 
. '"Th 
d the ~ur 
· os enmem1, e Lady Doth Protest 'too Much". Kosovo, an 
in International Law' (2002) 65 MLR 159. 
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Indeed th . 
Granted 'h e scept~es of Ideology and of unscholarliness arise here. 
the q '.t e world VIew of the researcher will influen
ce his inquiry into 
uestton wh th h I . . dignity d . .e . er t ~ u tlmate purpose of state sovereignty is human
 
interv a~ Ind1Vldua1 nghts, to revert to the example of humanitarian 
entton/res 'b'l' larly' if h ponsi I Ity to protect. But the inquiry can s
till be 'scho-
1\. ( ce t e .researcher argues ex suppositione in favour of norms: if norm 
B (ins~tralrty of the human being in international law) and norm 
C (res ru~e?~al character of state sovereignty) are valid, then norm 
scholaplo~~~bdity to protect) must also be valid. This type of reasoning is 
r y. 
Second th . . 
resear h ' .e Issue of Ideology/politics may well be pro
blematised by the 
ethica~ er htmself/herself. In other words, it is not just the (revived) 
is Pos ~tearch dimension, but also its reflection at the meta-level, which 
law's 
8
1
1 
. e (and needed) vis-a-vis the uneasy triangle of international 
globalc altm ~ 0 universality, the real diversity of lives, and the ideal of 
r p urahsm. 
scho~a~~~d~tde, the acknowledgement of the limited harvest of doctrinal 
ea}, th s tp .m the field of international law, and engagemen
t with empiri-
doctr· eol~etlca1 or ethical scholarship is apt to overcome exaggerated 
Ina Ism. 
A. 5.7 Conclusions 
Per:; tyP.e of international legal scholarship is ne
eded in the novel 
chara 0 ~ lllternational law we are living though, a period which is 
tion (ctensed by a high tension between interdependence and glob
alisa-
econo . 
I 
and 6 . illtc, technical, cult
ural) on the one hand, and stark c eavages 
h encing ('d . 
. . 
. 
I h 
and. In 1 eat10n~l, economic, tern tonal) at~o_ng ~tates, o? t 1e ot er 
scho1 h' such a penod of tension or even cnsts, m
ternattonal legal 
ars tp is · .1 • f 
· · M t 
of the . . partlctuarly vulnerable to vanous types
 o cnttque. os 
Cf!bcism · · 'fi 
· th 
curre Is not actually new but acquires a new 
stgm cance m e 
F. nt contex
t. 
trst · 
inter '.111 the face of a global North-South divide, an E
ast-West divide in 
the r nattonal relations and a looming political conflict b
etween Russia and 
( est of E · · · 
1· f h I h' 
cha Urope, the problem of eptstemtc nattona ts
m o se oars tp 
rge no 1). h' 
· IS Ighly relevant. 
149 
Weber, 'Scie ' 
'b'l' f" · t'fi " d o acy 
of p nee as a Vocatio11• n 45 at 22 ·on the impo
ss1 1 1ty o sCien 1 c a v c 
tactic 1 ' · ' ' · . . 
· 
Presu a standpoints _ except in the case of a d
1scusswn of means to a g1ven, 
PPosed end'. 
158 
ANNE l'ETERS 
1,. 
. al baCr> 1 ' natwn 
1 have submitted that the influence of the scho ar s ducti'lelY as 
ground is not inevitably pernicious but can be us~d prod probleJ'lla· 
long as the pitfall of epistemic nationalism is recogmsed an'ble) to wll1t~ 
tised.lt has been demonstrated that it is necessary (and posstd used, an 1 
arguments about international law that can be understo~ 
'·r nationa 
developed further by individuals independent frot11 t el 
background. 
. 
. r s:tU is on~J 
Charge no. 2 is the charge of ideology (of wht~h natlOn~ 1 cholarsh1P 
one manifestation). I have submitted that internat10nalleg 5 B.ovvever, 
can indeed not be conducted in a 'value-free' Ul~~ne\ 
aradigJ'll• 
researchers are not unavoidably trapped in their indlVtdua ~heir o'W11 
but can make explicit personal preconceptions and overcome tice, the 
framework.150 Though often insufficiently realised in . prac at vvhicb 
principle of objectivity remains the central regulatory tde~his wea115 
research in international law can and should be oriented. to worrY 
that the ideational and even ideological element is not a reason (besideS 
too much. Quite to the contrary, a normative analysis of the laWchef 111aJ 
a purely positive analysis) is necessary and valuable. The re~ear 1 ..,atue5 
and should 'draw upon general principles consecrating umversaretatio11 
upheld in the world community' to engage in teleological interpt to be itl 
of the rules at hand.151 And when those 'universal values turn °~·s or her 
conflict ... the interpreter will necessarily have to rely upon 
1 
to wal<e 
ideological or politicalleanings'152 which he or she would have 
visible as much as possible 
· 
·te the 
' 
. ppOSl ' 
Charge no. 3, the charge of unscholarliness, and tts 0 
4), have 
charge of practical irrelevance of much scholarship (charge nO· hiP a11d 
been examined. It has been argued that links between scholar~ rs 11eed 
practice can be mutually beneficial. Importantly, however, scho a assess 
to maintain a critical distance to practice if they want to be able tolves be 
and criticise practical applications of the law. If they let the:tUS~f bei11g 
sucked up by practice, or refrain from writing openly for fear 1 ) their 
'b t' c 
. . 
. 
unse s , 
urn tor pos1t1ons m legal practice (e.g. as arbitrators or eo 
scholarship normally becomes boring 
·otts11· 
h h 
· 
k n sert 
T .e c arge of doctrinalism (charge no. 5) has been ta e ·fied part5• 
Spec~fic. feat~ue.s of international law, its 'thinness', its un~odtod 
of laW 
and 1ts mbmlt mconsistencies and fragmentation make thts b y 
oo) 49 
1so c• A P, 
d istn' (2.0 
~· 
· eters and H. Schwenke, 'Comparative Law Beyond Postmo ern 
ICLQ 800, at 815-18. 151 Cassese, Five Masters, n. 49, at 259. 152 Ibid. 
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less suitable fi 
law Th or purely doctrinal analysis than do
mestic, weii-codified 
· e concl · · h 
are _ 1 . u
s10n IS t at complementary ways to conduct schola
rship 
re abvely k' 
nation 11 spe
a mg - more urgent here in order to conduct inte
r-
The a ~gal s~holarship successfully and professionally. 
intern ~.urld of mternational1ega1 scholars has always reacted to crises in 
has tr a 
10
nallaw with particular creativity and since time im
memorial 
occurre~ed these ruptures as new - scientific - beginnings. This much 
the See after the Thirty Years' War, after the F
irst World War and 
cond Wo Id W 153 · 1 
dl ' 
on Te , r ar. In the m1ddle of an apparent
 yen ess War 
and t~ror ' and on the brink of a new Cold War, there is the possibility 
Such eh need and for similarly creative internation
al legal scholarship. 
tionalsc holarship is as necessary as ever, because it 
is the job of interna-
the p se olars, as professionals, to develop ideas - i
deas which may have 
contr?ter of transforming international relations,
 and which therefore 
ne resl' Ute to 'realizing utopia': 
154 
'On resiste a !'invasion des armees; on 
lstepas ' z·· · 155 a mvaston des idees'. 
153 
After the Th. 
the Fir t W IrtyYears' War, G. W. Leibniz coined the phrase
 of the 'legal subject'. After 
of the s orld War, G. Scelle made a creative contrib
ution to the perennial question 
the th n~nnative basis of international law with the idea of dedoublement fonctionnel and 
terror ~~~hthat ~he individual is the actual subject of international law. After the Nazi 
the rec . e. Third Reich and the Second World War, H
ersch Lauterpacht advocated for 
At the ognitwn of international human rights Jaw and in
dividual criminal responsibility. 
of the Ssame time, the policy-oriented jurisprudence, developed in New H
aven at the end 
in a m econd World War, connected political science an
d international legal scholarship 
15 to newa~ 1 ner that was then quite original. Hence, it found a new meth
odological answer 
" 111tern r 1 1ss Cassese Ut ~ Iona political problems. 
V. Bug~ H~pza.' n. 121, at 683, quoting Hugo. 
' zstozre d'un crime: Deposition d'un temoin (Paris: Hetzel, 1877, 2
009), 639. 
